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# CITHARA

*essays in the Judaeo-Christian Tradition*

St. Bonaventure University

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CITHARA has as its purpose the publication of articles relating to the problems of man in the light of his heritage and of his future. Although investigations in the fields of liberal arts will more frequently furnish materials suitable for publication, the approach to such "essays in the Judaeo-Christian tradition" should be inter-departmental and should state or imply a relationship to that religious and cultural inheritance.


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To the memory of

REVEREND RODERICK PAUL WHEELER, O.F.M., PH.D.

1907 — 1958

Priest


Scholar

Friend

who long ago conceived the idea for this publication  
this first issue of *Cithara*  
is affectionately dedicated

*In pace requiescat*

*Sit ei terra levis*



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# Confitebor tibi in Cithara...

## An Editorial

*Confitebor tibi in cithara, Deus, Deus meus*<sup>1</sup> . . . sang the Psalmist, in the Latin of St. Jerome—to Thee, O God my God, I will give praise upon the harp.

From these words our periodical takes its name; in these words also can be seen adumbrated the nature and purpose of our efforts.

The *cithara*—Greek *kithare*—is a musical instrument which may be used to offer praise to God. Its name is both Latin and Greek, and may be a borrowing; its employment by the greatest of Hebrew Kings clearly marks the tradition which will be discussed and, it is hoped, be even riched within these pages.

Our theme is Western Man, his works, his thoughts, his aspirations. We view Western Man neither as an isolated entity to be dissected microscopically, nor as an independent being, self-sufficient unto himself. We are the inheritors of a glorious tradition, with all the virtues and shortcomings of human endeavor. We are also children and creatures of God, who sojourn for a brief period in the darkness, that we may win our way through perils to the shores of light.

Our Savior has said to us: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."<sup>2</sup>

We are also bound together by the common heritage of Western Man and the common destiny of all the children of Adam. Thus we are humanists.

We are humanists, however, not in the narrow and circumscribed sense that would bound all man's efforts in time, and center all his attentions upon himself. We look to eternity and to God for all final answers. In the meantime, that our journey may be less difficult, we try to illuminate our path and to put fear to flight. For fear, as the poet says, comes from ignorance:

Nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis  
in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus  
interdum, nilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam  
quae pueri in tenebris metuunt finguntque futura.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Psalm xlii. 5 (In some editions this may be listed as Psalm xliii.)

<sup>2</sup> Matthew xxii. 39.

<sup>3</sup> Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, II. 55-58: "For even as children tremble and fear everything in blinding darkness, so we sometimes dread in the light things that are no whit more to be feared than what children shudder at in the dark, and imagine will come to pass." (Bailey's translation).

Therefore, while we cannot hope, without divine inspiration, to arrive at final answers, it is incumbent upon us to employ our minds and to attempt to arrive at possible and even probable conclusions. We seek this knowledge in all areas of man's endeavor.

Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest  
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei  
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.<sup>4</sup>

Hence the genesis of *Cithara*—a periodical dedicated to the investigation and discussion of man in his relations to God, the Creator, and to his fellow-man. *Cithara* recognizes no academic, departmental boundaries. Terence had the last word:

Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Lucretius II. 59-61: "This terror of the mind then, this darkness, must needs be scattered not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature." (Bailey's translation).

<sup>5</sup> Terence, *Heautontimorumenos*, 77.

## ***The Dimensions of the Irish Question And the Home Rule Crisis, 1910-1914***

**Lawrence J. McCaffrey**

Frequently, historians attribute the success of Irish nationalism in destroying the Union to the failure of the British Government to respond sufficiently or in time to the basic religious, political, economic, and social needs that created and encouraged this nationalism. They describe most Government concessions to Irish demands as expedients designed to frustrate agitations before they became insurrections. Because, this argument goes on, these hastily designed sops to Irish claims were palliatives rather than remedies, their deficiencies created new and deepened old grievances, and, in the long run, antagonized rather than conciliated Irish national opinion.

There can be little doubt that to a great extent Irish nationalism resulted from British ignorance concerning conditions in Ireland and a lack of sympathy for Irish points of view. Still it is too easy to blame economic exploitation, sectarian strife, and the denial of political expression in Ireland on only the inadequacies of British politicians. Even when viewed from a 1961 perspective, the Irish Question's complexity defies simple solutions, and in their attempt to deal with it, British leaders were confronted with the limitations placed on political action by the party system, economic and political theories accepted as dogmas, and the pressures and prejudices of British public opinion.

At first glance, the Irish Question appears essentially religious in character and expression. Protestants who controlled the Irish Parliament in 1800 accepted the Union as a compact with British co-religionists to maintain the privileged position of the Protestant minority in Ireland. Although the Tory party and the Crown concurred in this interpretation of the Act of Union, Catholic Ireland refused to accept an apartheid policy which doomed it to permanent subordination to a religious minority. But conflicts that divided Catholic from Protestant involved much more than theological distinctions. For the most part, Protestants were the educated, property owning, prosperous, politically and socially dominant element in Irish society while Catholics comprised the landless, rack-rented, illiterate, and politically unrepresented portion of the community. While most of the emotional content of the Irish Question

centered on the religious issue, the essence of the Question was the attempt of a besieged minority, aided by an alien legislature, to maintain religious, political, economic and social ascendancy over an underprivileged and resentful majority increasingly aware of the power of organized and disciplined numbers. In Ireland, religion symbolized all the interests that distinguished a parasitical aristocracy on the defensive from the ambitious and aggressive peasant masses.

Modern Irish nationalism emerged as a badge of dignity and a promise of hope for a people who in the century before O'Connell had lost these human qualities. Nationalism was born in the struggle for Catholic Emancipation and resuscitated and revitalized in the agitation for self-government and tenant right. Because the demoralized masses at the beginning of the nineteenth century were for the most part unaware of the bond of nationality, the Act of Union by providing Catholic representation in Parliament could have forestalled the evolution of nationalism as a vital force in Irish affairs. By the 1840's, however, O'Connell's success in mobilizing Catholic opinion for religious and political purposes and Young Ireland's skill in preaching cultural nationalism made the Irish masses conscious of their strength and convinced them of their superiority over the "materialistic" and "bloodthirsty" Saxons holding them in bondage. The obstinacy of the Ascendancy in resisting logical and just concessions to the needs of the Catholic majority, coupled with the repeated failures of Parliament to cope with basic Irish problems, strengthened the "racial" and cultural aspects of the national movement, and made a solution of the Irish Question short of Home Rule impossible.

In general, Liberal Prime Ministers found it less difficult to deal with Irish discontent than their Conservative counterparts. Among the Whig, Liberal, and Radical components of the Liberal coalition there was extensive sympathy for such reforms as Catholic Emancipation, an expanded Irish suffrage, a state system of Irish elementary education, and restrictions on the wealth and influence of the Established Church. But in the early nineteenth century even the Liberals exhibited mental blocks when considering Irish needs. The *laissez faire* doctrines of the classical economists, an important part of the Liberal creed, served the interests of industrial England but were inapplicable to such Irish problems as landlord-tenant relations, unemployment, over-population and the result of these problems, famine. Radicals committed to the secular state obstructed the development of adequate systems of secondary and university education in Ireland because Irishmen were reluctant to accept a program that divorced intellectual training from theological considerations. All factions of the Liberal party, though friendly to various forms of Continental and Latin American nationalism, were cool to Irish claims of national sovereignty. They insisted that the Union was essential to Britain's defenses and to the maintenance



of the Empire and accepted the common Protestant position that Home Rule was just a mask for "Rome Rule."

In the period following 1867, however, Liberals made it increasingly clear that they were willing to go to previously rejected lengths to pacify Ireland. This remarkable about face resulted from Gladstone's sincere desire to settle the Irish Question, the Liberal party's abandonment of doctrinaire *laissez faire* for a more flexible approach to economic problems, and Parnell's success in organizing a disciplined and determined Irish party in the House of Commons. But most important, after 1870, Liberal leaders could not ignore the evidence indicating that dynamic Tory imperialism attracted a large section of the newly enfranchised working class, or the need to compensate for this Tory victory by attracting the support of Irish nationalists in the House of Commons. By 1886, Parnell realized that Home Rule depended on the endorsement of one of the British parties and that the Conservatives would not bid that high for an Irish alliance. Since the Liberals needed the Irish, even at the cost of a parliament in Dublin and tenant right, and the Irish needed the Liberals, though it meant cooperation with British secularists, Parnell and Gladstone concluded an alliance that weathered many storms in persisting until the outbreak of World War I.

Conservative politicians were bound by compact, religious sentiments, class privileges, and property interests to the Protestant Ascendency in Ireland, and Irish Protestants relied on the Conservative party to champion their cause in Parliament against the aspirations of the Catholic democracy. The landed gentry, the dominant element in the party, were eager to defend the Ascendency because they knew that concessions to the Catholic masses in Ireland would encourage radical assaults in Britain on the political power and property rights of the aristocracy. Since the Tories dominated the House of Lords, the Protestant Unionists enjoyed a veto power over all legislation tending to curb the privileges of their class or to weaken the bonds of the Union. When the House of Lords made it clear in 1894 that it would never consent to Irish self-determination, Irish nationalists finally realized that constitutional methods of agitation would never achieve Home Rule as long as the peers maintained veto power over legislation passed by the Commons. Therefore, elimination of the Lords' veto power became an essential part of the Irish party program and bridged the gap between nationalists and the radical section of the Liberal party.

Conservative resistance to Irish reform and self-government rested on a strong foundation, the anti-Catholic roots of British nativism. As late as the early twentieth century, respected British newspapers and periodicals frightened and excited their readers with "revelations" of Popish plots and Jesuit

conspiracies to undermine the Protestant foundations of the British constitution. Since the native Catholic population of Britain was relatively small, Ireland with her millions of Catholics served as a convenient whipping boy for no-Popery zealots.

Beginning with the Union, Britons were reluctantly forced to acknowledge the existence of the Irish Question. Irish debates occupied more than a proportionate amount of parliamentary attention, to the detriment of vital British and imperial legislation. Irish agitations—Catholic Emancipation, the tithe war, Father Mathew's temperance movement, the anti-poor-law campaign, tenant right demands, and Repeal—were reported, distorted, exaggerated, and editorialized in British newspapers and periodicals. Curiosity about a geographically close but culturally remote partner in the Union guaranteed interest in Irish writers who described Ireland and the Irish for British readers. Nineteenth century economic developments also encouraged Irish-British contacts. Every year, substantial numbers of Irish peasants supplemented meagre domestic incomes by working in the British harvest, and the employment possibilities in British factories attracted permanent Irish settlers to the boom towns of England and Scotland.

The information about Ireland and her people that the British gained from reading and personal association didn't encourage respect for their neighbors. They were shocked to learn of a place where contempt for British law and order seemed to be part of the national character and their Protestant nativist sensibilities were offended by the militant Catholic and anti-Unionist views of popular Irish leaders. Britain's industrial and agrarian proletariat resented cheap Irish competition on the labor market and all levels of British society resented these immigrants who spoke English in strange if melodious manner, demonstrated prodigality in financial matters, engaged in drunken brawls, increased the number of street walkers, worshipped God in a "superstitious" and "idolatrous" manner, and were overly submissive to an "ultramontane" clergy.

Because they were aware of British hostility and lonely and uncomfortable in an urban environment, the Irish clung together in their slum ghettos for mutual comfort and security. But by clinging to one another they accented their national vices and peculiarities. British critics of the Irish seldom tried to understand the psychological or sociological reasons for "Paddy's" delinquency and clannishness. Instead they preferred to bolster their egos by attributing Irish behavior patterns to a basic inferiority of character and the malignant nature of Popery.

British anti-Irish and anti-Catholic opinion, made more formidable by each expansion of the electorate, was a significant emotional factor in British

politics, making it difficult for members of Parliament to approach Irish questions in an objective manner. Professor Gilbert Cahill has demonstrated the importance of no-Popery sentiment on the structure and course of British politics in the first half of the nineteenth century. He has shown how politicians attempting to formulate a policy designed to pacify Ireland by reasonable concessions to Irish needs were vulnerable to the attacks of the no-Popery faction in and out of Parliament. He has analyzed in detail how Peel's plan to convert to Irish Catholic hierarchy and clergy to Unionism by easing the financial burdens of their church alienated British public opinion and the Tory element in his own party. This faction was so enraged by Peel's proposal to increase and make permanent the Maynooth grant that it took the first opportunity to turn its own leader out of office. The price of this revenge was a seriously weakened Conservative party that contributed to the political instability of the 1850's and 60's.<sup>1</sup>

The Cahill thesis is as valid for the last half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries as it is for the first five post-Union decades. Gladstone also discovered that British opinion could respond unfavorably to Government attempts to satisfy Irish nationalism, and like his old leader Peel, he also split his party in an effort to conciliate Ireland. With the completion of the Irish-Liberal alliance followed by the split in the Liberal party over Home Rule, the anti-Catholic orientation of British opinion became the most powerful weapon in the Unionist arsenal, and the Irish alliance the most vulnerable chink in the Liberal armor.<sup>2</sup>

The various attempts of Peel and Gladstone to reconcile Irish aspirations with Britain's domestic and imperial interests in the face of hostile British opinion and dissent within their own parties produced, perhaps, the most dramatic and revealing episodes in nineteenth century British history. But the most illuminating example of the interaction of the Irish Question on British politics and the difficulty of solving this question in an atmosphere dominated by no-Popery sentiment occurred in the period 1910-1914 when the Home Rule issue drove Britain to the precipice of civil war.

## II

In 1906, the Liberals were returned to office with an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons. Now that they were independent of the support of Irish nationalists, Liberal leaders decided to avoid the unpleasant fate of previous Liberal administrations by ignoring the pledge to secure Home Rule for Ireland. Instead, they decided to appease a demand for social reform that had been building up in Britain for twenty years and was reflected in the election of twenty-nine members of the recently formed Labour party to the House of Commons. In response to the Socialist challenge, the

Government enacted a program to alleviate many working class social security burdens. This welfare legislation necessitated large expenditures and demanded new sources of revenues. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer and dominant figure in the Cabinet, resorted to schemes originally suggested by the Fabians. He recommended substantial duties on the unearned income of landed property, higher income taxes for the prosperous, and, to please the Nonconformist element in his party as well as raise revenue, increased duties on spirits and tobacco.

Unionists in the House of Commons lacked sufficient numbers to resist this attack on wealth and property but their colleagues in the House of Lords were prepared to risk a stand. In violation of sanctified tradition, the Lords rejected Lloyd George's budget and precipitated a grave constitutional crisis. Liberal leaders decided to use this rash and unprecedented act as justification to destroy the absolute veto of the Lords. Labour M.P.'s who objected to the House of Lords as a citadel of property interests and a barrier to collectivism, and Irish nationalist M.P.'s who viewed the Lords as the major obstruction in the path of Home Rule, were more than willing to support the Liberal attack on the privileges of the peers.<sup>3</sup>

In January, 1910, Asquith, the Prime Minister, took the issues of the budget and the veto to the country. The results of the general election which returned 275 Liberals, 273 Unionists, 82 Irish nationalists, and 40 Labour M.P.'s was a severe jolt to the complacency of the Ministry. Why did the same electorate which had given the Liberal party a 224 seat advantage over the Unionists in 1906 reduce that lead to 2 only four years later, particularly after the Liberals had provided an extensive program to relieve the distress of the working class and had announced their intention to eliminate the most glaring undemocratic feature of the Constitution? Did many middle class and rural Liberal voters object to the Government's welfare program and the means of financing it, did members of the working class resent paying more for their pints and their smokes, did the increased Labour party vote indicate that the trade union leaders considered the Government's welfare program inadequate, was the House of Lords more popular than the Government imagined, were Britons apprehensive concerning German naval and military power? There is evidence to indicate that all these factors influenced voters but it is also true that the Irish Question played a significant role in this Unionist moral victory. Although the Liberals played down the Home Rule issue in their election addresses, Unionists emphasized that a successful attack on the House of Lords would be followed by a Liberal attempt to destroy the Union.

In November, 1910, after the Lords attempted to avoid catastrophe by passing the budget, Asquith, after consultation with the King, decided to ask

the electorate for a second opinion on the veto power of the upper house, and again the voters' decision was hostile to the Prime Minister. This time 272 Unionists were returned to match an equal number of Liberals and the Asquith Ministry found itself deeper in bondage to its Irish and Labour allies who controlled 84 and 42 seats respectively.<sup>4</sup> In this election Home Rule received equal attention with the impending Parliament Bill. The Prime Minister, speaking in Dublin, pledged Liberal support for Home Rule and Unionists described Asquith as a pawn of John Redmond, the Irish leader, and warned British voters that the fate of the Union was tied to the future of the House of Lords.

After considerable prodding from the Irish and Labour benches, the Government in February, 1911, introduced a bill limiting the power of the House of Lords to a three session suspensive veto over legislation passed by the House of Commons. When the peers realized that the King, if necessary, would honor his pledge to Asquith and pack the Lords to secure passage of the Parliament bill, they agreed to submit to the inevitable. The path was now clear for Home Rule, and Irish nationalists had delivered a fatal blow to their old enemy, the House of Lords.

Asquith introduced the third Home Rule bill in the early spring of 1912. He recommended a mild federal proposal placing local affairs in the hands of a Dublin parliament consisting of a popularly elected lower house, with a set number of representatives from each province, and a Senate nominated in the first instance by the Crown and subsequently by the Irish Executive. Ireland would retain a small delegation at Westminster to protect her imperial interests. Protestant rights were guaranteed in a number of ways: Ulster would be over-represented in the lower house of the Irish Parliament, the appointed Senate would no doubt contain a large Protestant representation, and the Irish Parliament could not endow or show favoritism to any religious body.

Redmond accepted this limited offer of self-government as a settlement of Irish claims, but the Irish Unionist leaders, Sir Edward Carson and Sir James Craig, made it clear that since they could no longer defeat Home Rule with constitutional weapons, they would not hesitate to employ physical force in order to preserve the Union. They rejected Federalism as detrimental to the interests of their constituents. Irish Protestants, they said, would not consent to any scheme that severed the religious, economic, cultural, and patriotic ties that bound them to Britain or forced their allegiance to a Dublin Parliament dominated by Anglophobe Papists determined to discriminate against a helpless Protestant minority.

Carson and Craig quickly demonstrated that they were not bluffing. In September, 1912, they led Ulster Protestants in signing a Solemn League and

Covenant binding Irish Unionists to resist Home Rule with every means at their disposal.<sup>5</sup> Soon an Ulster Volunteer Army began drilling under the Command of Lieutenant General Sir George Richardson, K.C.B.<sup>6</sup> Instead of repudiating words and deeds threatening armed resistance to the Constitution, Andrew Bonar Law, leader of the Opposition, gave an unqualified endorsement of and promised British Protestant support for any Irish Protestant effort to preserve the Union.

As the Home Rule bill made its stormy way through Parliament in the sessions of 1912, 1913, and 1914, events in Britain and Ireland confirmed fears that the Government could not enforce the Home Rule bill in northeast Ulster without risking the probability of civil war. Every day the Ulster Volunteers gained in strength and efficiency, and a successful gun-running operation in April, 1914, supplied them with valuable equipment to wage war. Added to the Government's difficulties was the distinct probability that army officers would refuse to move against the Ulster Volunteers if so ordered. Under the existing military system, army officers usually came from the same class that provided the Unionist party leadership, and it was only natural that Unionist sentiment should pervade the officer corps. Under the British system of Government, however, the army is non-political and is expected to carry out the orders of the Government without questioning their validity. In designating suppression of rebellion in Ulster as an exception to their duties, British officers permitted themselves a luxury denied enlisted men. As Labour M.P.'s put it: as long as enlisted men from the working class were used by the Government as strike breakers why should officers be exempted from enforcing laws offensive to the aristocracy?

In the period 1912-1914, many men in the upper echelons of the army conspired to defeat the parliamentary process. Lord Roberts, Chief of Staff, recommended Richardson to Carson as Commander and Chief of the Ulster Volunteers and later congratulated the Irish Unionist leader on the success of the gun-running operation. Sir Henry Wilson, an Ulster Protestant and Director of Military Operations, advised Carson and Craig to persist in their opposition to Home Rule and consulted with Bonar Law on ways by which the Opposition could amend the army appropriation bill to prevent the use of the military against the Ulster Volunteers. The rebellious and unreliable state of the army was made clear to all in March, 1914, when officers stationed at the Curragh announced their intention to resign their commissions in preference to engaging in military operations against Ulster Unionists. Asquith was reluctant to deal harshly with the army officers because events on the Continent indicated that Britain might soon need their skill against the Central Powers.

Probably the most formidable obstruction to Home Rule was the militant



pro-Unionist anti-Irish Catholic sentiment which existed in Britain. Public meetings, newspaper and periodical editorials, sermons from Protestant pulpits, petitions to Parliament, and a pattern of Unionist victories in by-elections indicated that most Englishmen were willing to support Ulster's resistance to Home Rule even to the extent of civil war.

Confronted by armed opposition to Home Rule in northeast Ulster, treason in the army, pro-Unionist no-Popery sentiment in Britain, and waning Liberal strength in the House of Commons, Asquith and his colleagues in the Cabinet decided concessions would have to be made to Carson. As early as 1913, some prominent Liberals suggested that portions of the province be excluded from the Home Rule settlement, and by 1914, Asquith openly conceded that exclusion was the only alternative to civil war. But two questions remained undecided: was exclusion to be temporary or permanent and how much of Ulster would be excluded? Asquith obtained Redmond's consent to a six year exclusion for any of the four northeastern counties indicating by plebiscite their desire to maintain the British connection, but Carson insisted on permanent exclusion of the whole province, a ridiculous claim since Ulster returned a nationalist majority to the House of Commons and Catholics outnumbered Protestants in all but these four counties. Negotiations ended at this point in a deadlock. Asquith could go no further in his effort to appease Ulster Unionists without encouraging a rebellion in southern Ireland.

For a considerable period of time following the introduction of the Home Rule bill, nationalist Ireland waited patiently for the parliamentary process to produce Home Rule. But as nationalists observed the growing armed might of Ulster, the pro-Unionist activity of high army officers, hostile anti-Irish demonstrations in Britain, Liberal defeats in by-elections, and the Prime Minister's effort to conciliate Carson and the Unionists, they became increasingly apprehensive and restless. Impressed with the success of the Ulster Volunteers in intimidating the Prime Minister, nationalists in 1913 organized the Irish National Volunteers to convince the Government, the House of Commons, and British opinion that they were just as determined to have an all Ireland parliament as the Orangemen of Ulster were to sabotage the Home Rule bill.<sup>7</sup> This volunteer army was organized independent of the Irish party by men who in many cases were members of Sinn Fein or the Irish Republican Brotherhood. At first, Redmond viewed the Volunteers as a threat to the Irish party, but when he became convinced that Asquith might compromise the Home Rule bill to appease Carson and British opinion, he publicly endorsed the military movement and obtained a deciding voice in its operation.<sup>8</sup> The patronage of the Irish party stimulated Volunteer enlistments and encouraged the financial support of Irish Americans.<sup>9</sup>

The Prime Minister now appeared to be in an inescapable dilemma. Home Rule had to be carried in some form or the Liberals would completely and permanently lose the Irish alliance and temporary control of the government. But a Home Rule bill that would not concede permanent Ulster exclusion to the Unionists would provoke an insurrection in northern Ireland and one that did would encourage rebellion in the South. In either case, civil war would engulf Britain as well as Ireland. Asquith did have two other alternatives. He could call for another general election, but all the signs indicated that the results would still keep him a prisoner of the Irish and Labour parties, or he could resign and surrender office to the Unionists, but since they could not command a majority in the Commons they would not be able to govern without the co-operation of Asquith and other moderate Liberals. A national coalition might have been able to steer Britain through the Home Rule crisis but it would alienate not only Irish, but also Labour and Radical support, from the Liberal party. By the summer of 1914 parliamentary government had obviously broken down in Britain and the politicians were at the mercy of forces not responsible to the House of Commons.

Since Carson would not budge from his impossible demand for all Ulster, Asquith decided to proceed with his original plan for six year exclusion of the four northeast counties of the province. His reasoning: six years would demonstrate the success or failure of Home Rule for the rest of Ireland, and in the meantime, the British electorate would have at least one and perhaps two opportunities to express its opinion on Home Rule for all of Ireland. The Prime Minister's exclusion proposal was introduced as an amending bill in the House of Lords but the Unionist majority in the upper house modified the bill to include all Ulster on a permanent basis and returned it to the House of Commons.

Asquith scheduled July 27 for a debate on the amending bill but events in Ireland forced a postponement. On Sunday, July 26, a company of National Volunteers unloaded a cargo of arms from a yacht near Howth and proceeded to march back to Dublin carrying their rifles. Their path was blocked by the assistant commissioner of Police and a battalion of the King's own Scottish Borderers who demanded that the Volunteers surrender the rifles. The front ranks of the Volunteers held off the Borderers with their rifle butts permitting the rest to escape with their weapons. When the Borderers returned to Dublin, they were taunted by a sidewalk crowd in Bachelor's Walk calling names and throwing stones. A few soldiers lost their patience and fired into the crowd, killing three and wounding thirty-six, over half seriously. The next day, Redmond in the House of Commons asked the Government for a delay of the amending bill debate so that an investigation could be made into the violent incident



in Dublin. He also inquired why the Ulster Volunteers were permitted openly to display smuggled arms in the North while similar action by the National Volunteers in the South resulted in an exhibition of military force. As usually happens in these cases, the Government quickly found a scapegoat. The Assistant commissioner of police took full blame for the incident and was censured, along with the commanding officer of the Borderers, by a judicial committee of inquiry.

The delay in the amending bill debate and the international crisis transferred the attention of the House of Commons and the British public to events on the Continent. When Sir Edward Grey informed Parliament on August 3 that Germany's threat to Belgian neutrality made probable a war on the Central Powers, Redmond immediately pledged the support of the National Volunteers to the Government. After hostilities commenced, Asquith and the Cabinet decided to shelve the Irish Question for the duration. To appease Irish nationalist opinion, Home Rule was placed on the statute books, but with Redmond's consent, the Liberals attempted to conciliate Unionists by passing a suspensory bill delaying the operation of Home Rule until after the war was over.

### III

By the narrowest of margins Britain escaped a civil war that was even more of a threat to her political system than the military strength of Germany and Austria. Short sighted politicians in both parties breathed a sigh of relief as they prepared for war, refusing to face the obvious fact that the war would not break down Ulster Unionist objections to Home Rule or Irish nationalist demands for an all Ireland parliament. No British leader realized that the stalemate of 1914 would so alter the direction of Irish nationalism that a permanent settlement of Irish claims could never be achieved through parliamentary processes or within the framework of the Empire.

The day that Asquith postponed Home Rule he delivered a fatal blow to constitutional nationalism in Ireland. For years the successes of the Irish party at Westminster silenced physical force Republicans who could neither accept the goal of Irish Federalism, autonomy under the Crown, nor the means of achieving this objective, parliamentary agitation. Sir Edward Carson in his effort to preserve the Union designed the instrument of its destruction. The Government could hardly prevent the Republicans and Sinn Feiners in the South from arming and drilling in defense of Parliament when it permitted the existence of an army in the North created to defy Parliament.

While the cause of Home Rule appeared prosperous, the leaders of the National Volunteers were in no position to challenge Redmond's leadership or his popularity with the Irish masses, but they continued to exploit the opportunity to enlist and drill Republican recruits. Redmond's acceptance of the moratorium on Home Rule and his open hearted support of Britain in time of international crisis presented Republicans and Sinn Feiners with grounds to question his patriotism and the validity of constitutional nationalism. They insisted that Redmond should have followed the maxim that "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity" and demanded guarantees in return for his pledge of Irish loyalty. The nationalist left argued that the failure of the Irish party to obtain Home Rule in 1914 was sufficient proof that Ireland would never enjoy the benefits of the British constitution and that anti-Irish and anti-Catholic British opinion would never permit Ireland political self-expression. They advised the youth of the country to reject the ballot and to place their reliance on bullets and bayonets. All over Ireland, young men listened to the new leaders and quietly began preparations to strike a blow for Irish freedom.

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#### FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Gilbert A. Cahill, "Irish Catholicism and English Toryism," *Review of Politics*, XIX, No. 1, (January, 1957), pp. 62-76, and "The Protestant Association and the Anti-Maynooth Agitation of 1845," *Catholic Historical Review*, XLIII, No. 4, (December, 1957), pp. 273-308.
- <sup>2</sup> The Unionist party was a coalition of the Conservative party and those Liberals who left their party in protest against the first Home Rule bill. Support of the Union and an aggressive imperial policy provided the party's emotional appeal but its domestic policy was determined by its Conservative orientation.
- <sup>3</sup> The Irish party supported the Liberals even though the budget was antagonistic to the important brewing and distilling industries of Ireland.
- <sup>4</sup> More accurately, the Irish party had the allegiance of 75 M.P.'s. Nine Irish members referred to themselves as Independent Nationalists and followed the leadership of either William O'Brien or Timothy Healy.
- <sup>5</sup> On September 25, 1913 (Ulster Day), Ulster Unionists published plans for their Provisional Government. Carson would be Chairman and the new administration would go into effect the day Parliament passed the Home Rule bill for the third time.
- <sup>6</sup> The Ulster Volunteers dated their beginning back to September 25, 1911, when the first plans for the Provisional Government of Ulster were discussed. In that Ulster Day procession, a group from Tyrone marched with such military precision that they inspired other Orange and Unionist organizations to begin military training. An application for legal status for the Ulster Volunteers was made on January 5, 1912, and was granted by two Belfast justices of the peace.

- <sup>7</sup> The Irish National Volunteers, founded in November, 1913, was in fact the second volunteer army established in the South. During the transport strike in Dublin, August, 1913 to January, 1914, the Transport Workers' Union organized the Irish Citizen Army modeled on Carson's Ulster force. On Easter Monday, 1916, the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army joined forces in a common attack on British rule in Ireland.
- <sup>8</sup> Redmond in July, 1914, obtained for the Irish party the right to nominate half the members of the Irish Volunteers Executive Committee. He forced the Volunteer leaders to make this concession by threatening to establish a rival volunteer army.
- <sup>9</sup> In January, 1914, the Irish National Volunteers had only 10,000 or so enlistees, but by May there were about 100,000 members. After Redmond took charge enlistments rose to over 15,000 a week. The United Irish League of America promised Redmond that the National Volunteers would have all the money they needed to defend the Home Rule cause.

## *Romeo: Hermit, Pilgrim, Mystic*

**Edward F. Callahan**

A close analysis of three major scenes showing Romeo in love may serve as an aid to the further understanding of Shakespeare's work of describing a young man passing through a series of stages toward maturity. It may furthermore add to the understanding of Shakespeare's use of evolving images as well as strengthen the dramatic substance of the play as a whole. But in addition to these interests concerning the play, such an examination may suggest similarities between Romeo and the metaphysical love poets. Finally, it may help in connecting the play thematically to his later dramatic works.

The three chief scenes of Romeo in love are: Montague's description of his lovesick son (Act I, Scene 1); Romeo at the Capulet ball (Act I, Scene 5); and Romeo's farewell to Juliet (Act III, Scene 5). Two further brief glimpses serve as links between these scenes: Romeo's discussion with Benvolio (Act I, Scene 2); and Romeo's meeting with Juliet at Friar Laurence's cell (Act II, Scene 6). The three major episodes are separated by the two brief transitional sections which mark the stages of Romeo's growth between the major scenes of development.

Immediately following the formal exposition of the play (Act I, Scene 1, lines 1-110), Montague and Benvolio turn to the discussion of Romeo and his lovesickness for Rosaline:

Many a morning hath he there been seen,  
With tears augmenting the fresh morning's dew,  
Adding to clouds more clouds with his deep sighs;  
But all so soon as the all-cheering sun  
Should in the farthest east begin to draw  
The shady curtains from Aurora's bed,  
Away from light steals home my heavy son,  
And private in his chamber pens himself,  
Shuts up his windows, locks fair daylight out  
And makes himself an artificial night:  
Black and portentous must this humour prove,  
Unless good counsel may the cause remove.

(lines 137-148)

In these lines the germs of Romeo's later ecstasy are hidden beneath the images of distorted fulfillment of love. It is generally accepted that Romeo is experiencing the pangs of adolescent love, more infatuated with love than with the object of it, Rosaline. His actions are so close to the accepted behavior of the traditional lover that one questions their sincerity or that they arise from anything more than puppy love. Furthermore, in this artifice of distraction there is also a suggestion of a perversion of the mystical experience of love, which Romeo does not realize until after his union with Juliet.

Although this description has been thoroughly explored countless times, it is necessary to retrace some of the standard tracks in order to point out certain elements which find development in the following scenes. The time of Romeo's described actions is dawn, as is the time of the aubade in the scene of farewell between Romeo and Juliet. But in this scene the morning is feared as the bringer of day and light, not as the harbinger of death as in the later scene. In this scene the sun is feared and avoided for its light which brings back the world to Romeo, a world which he cannot face or accommodate with his affection for Rosaline. Romeo's sighs cloud the morning light and he flees the romantic image of the bed of Aurora. Not until Romeo sees Juliet in the tomb can he welcome the bed of light. Instead, as a young and inexperienced lover he creates a darkness in his chamber shutting out the reality of day.

Romeo chooses to dwell apart from the world. Any evidence of that world which the sun may reveal is blocked out. He seeks privacy, union or satisfaction with contemplating himself in relation to Rosaline. He avoids seeking out opportunities to encounter Rosaline as the more dedicated lover would traditionally do. At night he does not choose the romantic device of standing beneath her window as he does when he seeks Juliet. Instead he prefers the lonely walk in the fields and groves and the privacy of his chamber.

Montague concludes his description with a bit of parental moralizing believing the best therapy to be "good counsel," that facile remedy in which Capulet, Montague and Friar Laurence place so much confidence. The elders in the play rely on common sense to solve the problems of youth. Failing to realize the nature of the experience of youth, they widen the gap between the two age groups and thus bring about the tragic catastrophe. As we will see later, this suppression of love through morality is instrumental in the disaster in *Antony and Cleopatra*.

The remainder of the scene following Romeo's entrance and his witty exchange with Benvolio furnishes us with the first glimpse of Romeo in love. The word play is witty and hollow and though we are allowed the privilege of hearing Romeo speak of his love for Rosaline, we get little further under-

standing of the quality of that love beyond what Montague has described. Romeo is displaying his romantic wounds to Benvolio. His description of Rosaline is particularly lifeless. For all we know of her she could have been drawn from the traditional love poetry of the time as much as she could be a real person. Romeo is involved in the artifice of love and his words are so like those of others that he elicits little sympathy or understanding of his predicament.

In the second scene of the same act Romeo continues this pose with Benvolio. He protests that anyone could offer a substitute for his affections for Rosaline. In a *Venus and Adonis* stanza, Romeo declaims his constancy and introduces certain images which will develop into the poetry of his encounter with Juliet.

When the devout religion of mine eye  
Maintains such falsehood, then turn tears to fires;  
And these, who often drown'd could never die,  
Transparent heretics, be burnt for liars!  
One fairer than my love! the all-seeing sun  
Ne'er saw her match since first the world begun.  
(lines 93-98)

The first image of note is the religious one. This religious theme of the heretics carries through and changes in the sonnet with Juliet into the image of the saint and the palmer. In this change from heretic to palmer to saint Shakespeare shows Romeo's transformation from Rosaline to Juliet. It is ironic that this growth is prepared for in this stanza swearing constancy to Rosaline. At its first appearance this religion-love motif may not seem significant. But Shakespeare's image patterns frequently begin subtly. As Romeo moves toward union with Juliet, the image becomes more important, ultimately suggesting the mystical-sexual analogy of metaphysical love poetry.

The second image is that of fire, important for its later development in the light image pattern. The fire for the heretics, the "all-seeing sun" with its religious overtones in the modifier, and the match (a possible pun on the word for a taper burned to tell the hours); all of these contract the light with darkness-seeking Romeo. Here the sun is only a device of Romeo's rhetoric; later it will become central to the light image pattern and serve even another function in the farewell scene between the two lovers.

The second major scene of Romeo in love (Act I, Scene 5) shows the first change which Romeo undergoes in his education toward the full understanding of love. It is heralded by his immediate and often quoted response on first seeing Juliet, "O, she doth teach the torches to burn bright!" (line 46). Traditionally

this is considered to be a more telling change than it really is. All would agree that it suggests a major alteration in Romeo's attitude toward love. Immersed in the image of light, quite different from the darkness in which he entertains romantic thoughts of Rosaline, he takes a violent step forward by forgetting for a moment himself as the subject of the experience of love. He focuses upon the object, Juliet, as existing and operating outside himself. However, the depersonalization is not complete nor the change in character permanent, for the rapture ends with Romeo's return to himself.

The measure done, I'll watch her place of stand,  
And, touching hers, make blessed my rude hand.  
Did my heart love till now? Forswear it, sight!  
For I ne'er saw true beauty till this night.

(lines 52-55)

The suggestion of light here is interesting for the obvious comparisons it can suggest with Romeo's earlier choice of darkness and blindness to the external world. Later it develops in the resolution of the growth pattern. Romeo, now intent upon something outside himself, thinks of communication with it and the faculty of sight becomes the means of contact with beauty. The religious theme is woven in with the reference to Juliet as sanctifier. Here also is the entrance of the hand which is developed in the imagery of the sonnet a few lines later. The "rude hand" may also suggest more than Romeo as the unworthy lover but may suggest the private sin of autoerotism in his separation from light and social contact. Such a suggestion seems valid when we consider the self-centeredness with which Romeo indulges his love for Rosaline. It underlines forcefully the great change Romeo undergoes when he first sees Juliet, and all feelings of self are driven out of his mind in his first response to the shining existence outside and independent of himself.

The major action of this scene is the verbal exchange between Romeo and Juliet at their first meeting. The verbal duel, typical of Shakespeare's romantic lovers in the plays written during his first decade of composition, has particular importance here. Despite the supposed success of Romeo in the game, closer examination will show Romeo as an awkward, nervous composer of the sonnet with Juliet.

Romeo: If I profane with my unworthiest hand  
This holy shrine, the gentle fine is this:  
My lips, two blushing pilgrims, ready stand  
To smooth that rough touch with a tender kiss.



Juliet: Good pilgrim, you do wrong your hand too much,  
Which mannerly devotion shows in this;  
For saints have hands that pilgrims' hands do touch,  
And palm to palm is holy palmers' kiss.

Romeo: Have not saints lips, and holy palmers too?

Juliet: Ay, pilgrim, lips that they must use in prayer.

Romeo: O, then, dear saint, let lips do what hands do;  
They pray, grant thou, lest faith turn to despair.

Juliet: Saints do not move, though grant for prayers' sake.

Romeo: Then move not while my prayer's effect I take.

(lines 95-108)<sup>1</sup>

The image of the heretic is now the image of the pilgrim. The hand has now by synecdoche become the palm, which joined with Juliet's hand forms praying hands and thus suggests the palmer or pilgrim. In this union of the two hands the pilgrim and saint are joined. The reference to the hand may also recall the earlier suggestion of Romeo's autoerotism. The hands as agents of contact become transformed into the lips with their physical and verbal activity of communication. The self-centered Romeo now actively seeks communication with the object of beauty outside himself.

The newness of the communication in the act of love and the involvement with an object outside of self is complicated by Romeo's almost nervous concentration on the game of developing the imagery and versification. The intercommunication between subject and object is followed toward the end by joining two separate beings in one form. This is symbolized for both Romeo and Juliet in the bringing of two wits together in the poetic form of the sonnet. But despite the conscious working toward this union there is an impetuous inexperience on Romeo's part which keeps the union from being selfless and therefore it is imperfect.

The first quatrain is Romeo's challenge; the second Juliet's response. In this octet both parties are separate and independent. Each has his own quatrain with its own rhyme scheme, and the communication is metrically and personally not effected. With the beginning of the sestet, however, the two separate entities fuse metrically in the quatrain. Romeo offers the first line; Juliet the second; and Romeo swoops in to capture the last two. The breaking

<sup>1</sup> I have departed from the usual manner of setting up these lines in order to make clearer the quatrain structure of the sonnet.



of the rules and taking from Juliet her right to the fourth line is a sign of Romeo's impetuosity and clumsiness in this new venture.

This is again brought out in Romeo's addition of a fifteenth line to the sonnet after he and Juliet have balanced each other in the concluding couplet. Juliet, however, retrieves the mistake and continues the play:

Romeo: Thus from my lips, by yours, my sin is purged.

Juliet: Then have my lips the sin that they have took.

Romeo: Sin from my lips? O trespass sweetly urged!

Give me my sin again.

Juliet: You kiss by the book.  
(lines 109-112)

In this conclusion and epilogue to the sonnet Romeo shows himself not completely adept at poetic interchange. Impetuously he tries to triumph and thus breaks the pattern. He still looks upon the love game as one to win. This self-concern is seen in the line with which he follows the sonnet. He inserts the reference to Juliet, "by yours," in the midst of the personal references, "my lips," and "my sin." When Juliet picks up this line and continues the game, Romeo again rushes in too zealously, goes beyond his line limit and adds a half line, perhaps to trap Juliet and win the game. But Juliet completes his half line, "Give me my sin again," by adding the satiric half line comment, "You kiss by the book." Typical of Juliet, she is more in command of the situation than Romeo.

In this verbal and metrical exchange Romeo is in the process of freeing himself from the self-centered idea he had toward love earlier. Juliet has become the challenge of a desirable object, separate, independent and therefore inviting conquest. As yet, however, he is not sufficiently adept at mastering the situation. It is Juliet who salvages the quatrain epilogue to the sonnet by adding her half line, thus suggesting a union. Romeo is still a novice in this high-level romantic play. He cannot completely forget himself in the exchange, Juliet, a much wiser person, is not upset with his breaking the rules and though she wins metrically, we know from future statements that her object is to "lose a winning match" (Act III, Scene 2, line 12). Much of the nurse's worldly practicality has rubbed off on her Juliet.

By the conclusion of the first act Shakespeare has shown us Romeo emerging from adolescence. Rosaline and his juvenile activity concerning her are abandoned and he is in the process of learning the ways of an enduring and substantial love. The union of the two half lines prefigures the later union of the lovers. Although the success of the line is mainly the work of the wiser Juliet, it does

offer in the light of Romeo's growing realization of the life of love a promise that a more satisfactory union will follow.

The transitional scene showing the imbalance which still exists between Romeo and Juliet in the reciprocal business of love appears at the end of the second act. Here, in Friar Laurence's cell, the lovers exchange brief and rather colorless comparisons of their feelings and their attitudes toward love. It is helpful to examine it briefly to clarify for us the relationship between the two at the time of their marriage. It is the last time they appear together until after the consummation of their marriage. By then they have approached a communication far beyond the one realized as possible here.

Romeo says:

Ah, Juliet, if the measure of thy joy  
Be heap'd like mine and that thy skill be more  
To blazon it, then sweeten with thy breath  
This neighbour air, and let rich music's tongue  
Unfold the imagined happiness that both  
Receive in either by this dear encounter.

(lines 24-29)

Romeo still appears to be partially concerned with himself as the subject, enjoying the experience of love. Although he sees Juliet as the cause of this feeling, his words lack any statement of the two as one. Juliet is seen as the cause of the feeling within him, a stage not far removed from his attitude toward Rosaline. Of equal importance is the fact that the love is still expressable in terms of feeling to Romeo.

Juliet's reply, as may be expected, is less personal or emotional. There is the tone of Cordelia's realism in her answer:

Conceit, more rich in matter than in words,  
Braggs of his substance, not of ornament:  
They are but beggars that can count their worth;  
But my true love is grown to such excess  
I cannot sum up sum of half my wealth.

(lines 30-34)

She sees and speaks of love, not feeling. Unlike Romeo who tries to express his feelings, she says it is impossible. Again her ability to handle things clearly and see things as they are is a sign of her superiority to Romeo at this point. The only significant development in Romeo's lines is the image of Juliet sweetening with her breath the neighboring air. As we will see, this transfusing

of the beloved into the natural world is something which is accomplished in Romeo's vision at the point in which he achieves his deepest knowledge of love and his greatest maturity.

The actual final stage of Romeo's loss of self is most probably effected during the progress of Act III, Scene 4, while Capulet is making plans with Paris for Juliet's wedding. The scene, if we see it as taking place simultaneously with the consummation of the marriage of Romeo and Juliet, is full of irony. But in addition to this, if we examine Capulet's remarks at this time, we notice that there is an even more subtle and important juxtaposition of the two actions.

Capulet appears to be the logical extension into old age of Romeo's earlier self-centeredness. His rudeness to Paris, "But for your company, I would have been a-bed an hour ago;" his inability to appreciate fully the tragedy of Tybalt, "Well we were born to die;" his pharisaical grief, "Wednesday is too soon, O' Thursday let it be . . . It may be thought we held him carelessly;" all these are statements of a self-centered man, unconscious of beings or values outside himself. In a way, Capulet is the logical and social extension through years of Romeo's earlier self-centeredness.

Whether Shakespeare intended this scene to operate in contrast to the selfless interchange between Romeo and Juliet is, of course, open to debate. It seems unlikely that it was initially planned that way since there is provision made by Lady Capulet to visit her daughter and convey the news of the marriage before she goes to bed. However, Shakespeare may have realized the possibility of the contrast as an afterthought, for he does not have Juliet informed of the date of the marriage until after Romeo's departure on the next morning.

Act III, Scene 5, Romeo's scene of maturity in love, operates in direct balance to the two scenes of the initial and middle stages of his romantic growth. It stands as the culmination of that movement from his stealing home at dawn, through the sonnet scene with Juliet.

The contrast with the first scene of Romeo in love with Rosaline is obvious. Morning in both scenes serves as a reminder that the night's activity is over. But in this scene the morning is a reminder of real danger and a call to action. In the earlier scene, morning is the herald of the return of the real world. In the morning of Rosaline's love it prompts Romeo to escape from reality; in this scene it prompts him to an acceptance of the physical world.

The more obvious analogy to this scene in which the lovers join in an aubade is the scene in which the two joined in the formation of the sonnet. The difference is quite significant, however. The sonnet was a device of joining; the aubade one of separation. The wit is evident in both but in the latter it is

more relaxed and playful, despite the danger which comes with the dawn. In the aubade there is no substantial competition taking place. The constricting verse pattern of the sonnet has melted into the more relaxed image play of the aubade. The bridling versification is no longer needed. The mutual giving of self to each other has made such restrictions and signs of individuality unnecessary.

The figures of the lark and the nightingale are more playfully handled than those of the palmer and the saint. Here the lovers take opposite sides almost out of sportive contrariness. They know it is the lark and both wish it the nightingale. Juliet says it is the nightingale; Romeo, choosing to be more realistic than Juliet for the first time, says it is the lark. But in the middle of the play, Romeo decides to agree that it is the nightingale. Juliet playfully and also because of a return to reality says it is the lark. The passionate intensity of the sonnet is lost before the playful relaxed interchange despite the presence of real danger. The self-conscious fusion of rhymes is now the mature intercommunication in which both accept the nightingale and the lark. This interchange of selves is the result of the sexual consummation. Both Romeo as well as Juliet have learned how to "lose a winning match." The individualities of the two as seen in the sonnet are fused into a unity in which the sides of the debate are interchangeable. Nightingale is lark, pilgrim is saint.

The most significant part of the aubade is noted when comparisons of the earlier scenes are forgotten and the transformed Romeo reacts to the world which he once shunned. He says:

It was the lark, the herald of the morn,  
No nightingale: look, love, what envious streaks  
Do lace the severing clouds in yonder east:  
Night's candles are burnt out, and jocund day  
Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain tops.  
I must be gone and live, or stay and die.

(lines 6-11)

This is the transformed Romeo, who can now accommodate the vision of the "shady curtains from Aurora's bed." He is able to accept the coming of the day and exult in it even if it means his personal death if he ignores it. He can see the beauty of the world for what it is even if it prompts his separation from one death for another, "I must be gone and live or stay and die."

The union of Romeo and Juliet has in the metaphysical world brought about more than a mere intercommunication between two lovers. As in the mystical union, when the beloved and the lover form a unit for a moment outside of time, all that takes place in time thereafter is infused with the joy of the

mystical experience. The world to the mystic as to the lover in metaphysical poetry is completely transformed by the union.

Romeo's transformation is most evident. The world he lived in before his marriage is not the world he lives in now. Unlike Capulet, whose self-centeredness has persisted, Romeo has forgotten himself even in the face of danger. For the first time he can face the light of day. For the first time he can revel in the beauty of the world revealed. His use of the words "envious" and "jocund" have obviously the personal reference of the lover's feelings but these feelings are now infused into the world and the love of Romeo and Juliet is the morning world which the lark heralds. There is the suggestion that their world hereafter will be infused with their love. Having experienced the intercommunication between each other, the lovers can now turn to communicate with the world of beauty bathed in the morning sun of their love.

A detailed examination of these has shown Romeo as the novice in the art of love. He passes from adolescent affectation and private self-centeredness not abruptly but gradually in a quasi-mystical ascent from self to union and transfiguration of the world. His first response to Juliet is significant mainly because it is the initial wrenching of his desire into focus on an object completely outside himself. Juliet is contemplated for a moment free of any personal reference or personal satisfaction. His first action in the new love is an inexperienced, bookish kiss, but it is far more mature than his withdrawal from contact with Rosaline. The selfish lover's hands are transformed into those of a pilgrim by the pure saint. Finally the union of Romeo and Juliet, two distinct individuals, is like the mystical fusion, a private one taking place while the crass selfish world goes on its way to destroy such a love. The descent from the union is one of a return to a transfigured world. Romeo has been transformed into a mature lover and the love abides and sustains the world bathed in the morning's "all-seeing" sun.

In the characterization of Romeo and the creation of an all-infusing love, Shakespeare seems to have hit upon some themes which will appear in his later work. Romeo's maturing into acceptance of the world serves as a bridge between the self-centered Richard II and the maturing Hamlet, who grows toward an acceptance of a reality in which the divine concursus is omnipresent. Like Shakespeare's tragic figures in his later plays, Romeo is taught to see, to put off the "inky mantle" and look at the sun-illuminated world. He chooses to abandon the world of private darkness and self and to identify himself with the world of transcendent beauty about him. If there is a resurrection motif in Shakespeare's late comedies, Romeo's growth in these scenes prefigures it.

The transforming quality of the love of Romeo and Juliet suggests the

love in *Antony and Cleopatra*, a play which in many ways is quite different from this story of youthful love. But between the young lovers and the old ones there is a similarity in the quality of their love. Both are able to accommodate the whole world in the mystical way of their love. In Romeo's breaking away from personal considerations and in his full identification of himself and his love with the world, he is not too different from Antony and Cleopatra, whose love reverberates throughout the known world and even makes claims on paradise. Both loves operate in defiance of moralistic and stabilizing pressures. To one love these pressures come from the family; to the other they come from Rome. Capulet is a paternal Octavius attempting to regulate love within the bounds of common sense and social probity. Paris and Octavia represent marriage without love but with familial blessing. But both pairs of lovers participate in a world of communication so intense that it separates them from the society of laws and "good counsel." In one sense, both loves are destroyed by these restrictions; but in another sense they destroy themselves in order to achieve a union beyond death and the law.

As early as *Romeo and Juliet* Shakespeare seems aware of the dramatic qualities of the mystical way of love. Like Romeo's kiss, it is more "by the book" than the transcendent and less systematic love of Antony and Cleopatra. However, it seems that Shakespeare first had to explore this aspect of young love before he could assault the world with his story of the love of "the firm Roman" and "great Egypt."

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# An Analysis of Albert Camus' *The Fall*

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The death of Albert Camus in a tragic and unnecessary automobile accident cut short the work of a man who in 1954 considered that his real thought was only beginning to flower. The literary works of this artist and philosopher had been received for the past eighteen years with an acclaim unusual for a man of the author's comparative youth. Convinced of the impossibility of finding a principle of explanation for the universe, he had developed his thought with the absurd as a starting point and rebellion as a basic attitude toward life. His novels and plays are really the outcome, illustration and consummation of these themes of absurdity and revolt.

After his death many editorials and literary articles paid tribute to the accomplishments of Camus, this paradoxical man of sorrow and optimism. For the most part these writings have been concerned with the general trend of his ideas and their influence on the mind of contemporary Europe. If, however, Camus is to retain his influence and reputation in the minds of succeeding generations, a more precise analysis of his individual works must be presented in order to point out their objective artistic and philosophic worth. It is to further this understanding of the lasting value of Camus' writings that we offer these considerations of his more recent and controversial work, *The Fall*.<sup>1</sup>

*The Fall*, written in 1956, opens with the polite but vaguely insinuating voice of Jean-Baptiste Clamence as he offers to request a drink for the silent listener in the *Mexico City* bar, a rather murky establishment in Amsterdam. With this as a foothold for further conversation, Clamence accepts the invitation to sit down and chat while they enjoy their drinks. This chance meeting evolves into a conversation, or rather, a monologue lasting five days in which Clamence relates the story of his life. Celebrated as a defender of the oppressed, the ex-Parisian barrister had lived a life of apparent contentment until the night when he committed an act of cowardice. That night a girl had fallen

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<sup>1</sup> The textual references to follow are taken from *The Fall*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1957); also, from *The Rebel*, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1954), and from *The Myth of Sisyphus*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Vintage Books, Inc., 1959).



or jumped from a bridge into the Seine, and Clamence, standing less than a hundred yards away, had failed to answer her cries, had deliberated about diving in and saving her, and then had walked away into the misty silence of the night. Two years later, while standing on a bridge over the Seine, laughter burst out behind him, laughter that continued, though diminishing, as if floating downstream. This laughter sliced through Clamence's superficially virtuous life and revealed his past as one continuous, shameful lie. Clamence relates how he had tried to escape the laughter and the realization of guilt which it brought by turning to debauchery and cruelty. But this 'cure' did not succeed and he realized that he had to submit to live in the 'little-ease' prison of self-guilt. Fleeing from the unbearable judgement of others, he pronounces judgement on himself whenever he can, and, by a twist of logic, thus becomes able to judge other men who are ignorant of their guilt. Hence his present occupation as judge-penitent in the *Mexico City* bar.

This, in brief, is the story of Jean-Baptiste Clamence. What does the story tell us? Whom, if anyone, is Clamence supposed to represent or symbolize? What was the author's purpose in writing this book? What relation does this book have to the rest of Camus' works? These are some basic questions, the answers to which can enrich our understanding of the book itself as well as of the author, Albert Camus.

Some commentators are inclined to identify Camus with Clamence. Indeed, Camus seems almost to challenge us to do so because of the biographical references to himself in Clamence's story. Clamence's past defense of innocence and freedom recall Camus' defense of the innocent individual against the world's oppressive evil in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, and of the rebel's inner value against tyranny and logical murder in *The Rebel*. To say, however, that Clamence mirrors the mind of Camus oversimplifies the case and seems unwarranted in the light of Camus' statements of his own fundamental positions.

A better approach to a critical analysis of the meaning of *The Fall* might be to examine the questions that Clamence raises and to set forth his answers to these questions as they are found in the story. These answers we shall compare with the answers that Camus presents in *The Rebel* and *The Myth*. From this comparison we may judge the likeness or disparity between the author and his creation, thus laying a foundation for our theory of the purpose behind Camus' writing of *The Fall*.

## II

The best way to approach and penetrate to the person of Jean-Baptiste Clamence is through the busy door of his intellect. He possesses deep longings,



to be sure, but these are always subject to the precision of his mind. In the course of his monologue Clamence questions some fundamental realities in human life: the possibility of friendship, the nature of freedom and law, the meaning of life and death, guilt and judgement. From the answers that he proposes to these questions, we shall attempt to sketch his basic attitudes and thereby define, in a relative way, the man himself.

Clamence's life has two main divisions to it, the time preceding the fall, and the sorry and lengthy aftermath. Previous to the fall, he was supposedly virtuous; he defended the oppressed, gave alms to the poor, was kind to the infirm and to those in mourning. After the fall, he analyzed these actions and saw that they were performed out of pride and self-love. Several times he equates virtue with hypocrisy, claiming that men play at being generous and sincere merely to gain the praise and approval of others. Friendship shall perhaps be possible in the future, he says at one point, but his past experiences show it to be a sham. He has no friends, only accomplices. The superficiality of friendship appears when a friend dies; his death is received either with indifference or else with an all too short-lived grief. True love might be possible two or three times in a century, but in the eyes of Clamence, love amounts to nothing but a disguise for boredom and vanity. The very act of love testifies to man's selfishness and desire for conquest. He had tried to find true love in order to escape from the laughter, but his past habits of pleasure-seeking and cruelty with women defeated his attempts.

His cowardly refusal to attempt the rescue of the girl in the Seine raises the question of the nature of freedom and, indirectly, the nature of guilt and the possibility of judgement. Clamence was faced with a decision; fundamentally it was to choose to attempt to rescue the girl with the possible danger to his own life, or to ensure his own safety by allowing the girl to drown. Perhaps he could have called out to others in the vicinity to come to her aid, perhaps he could have called for the police. In either case it would have been too late. If the girl was to be saved, only he could save her. But to do that he must plunge into the cold water with the resulting danger to his own life by drowning. Besides, it would be such an inconvenience, wet clothes and all that. Since no one was present to praise his action or censure his refusal to act, it seems that only two motives were possible, the simple desire to save a drowning person, or the desire to preserve his own safety and comfort. Clamence chose himself. This act revealed to him the terrible responsibility of freedom. There is no law that says, "Thou shalt save thy sister when she falls into the river," and yet his refusal to save her incurred the lifelong torture of guilt.

What the nature of a free act means for Clamence we can surmise from

his statements, all of them disparaging, about conventions, ulterior motives and law. Freedom in his opinion means the ability to choose to act in the absence of any motives, of any norms, of any reasons whatsoever except that, "This is what I want to do." Why does he act thus? He acts simply because he wants to, with no obligations directing him to what is right or wrong (for who can say what is right and what is wrong?). Thus the free man lives in a desert; with no landmarks on the horizon, the only source of meaning is himself, and there is only one direction possible, to retreat inward away from the loneliness and chaos of the unexplainable world. In the scene where Clamence and his newly discovered friend take the boat trip across the Zuider Zee, Camus attempts a symbolic representation of this freedom. The heavy mist and dull grey sky veil the outline of the shore and isolate the boat in the midst of the haphazardly corrugated sea. Thus the free man scuds along the water on his own power with no port ahead and no stars, islands or mountains to guide him.

That Clamence understands this as the meaning of freedom seems evident from his remarks about law and slavery. Law opposes freedom. Law attempts to simplify life by ordering every act, by pointing out what should be done, what should not be done, what is good and what is evil. And since for Clamence God is 'out of style', any law that distinguishes good from evil is arbitrarily set up by another man. "In short, you see, the essential is to cease being free and to obey, in repentance, a greater rogue than oneself" (p. 136). Any actions that are governed by a norm or by principles of law are acts of slaves and not of free men.

That is why, *tres cher*, after having solemnly paid my tribute to freedom, I decided on the sly that it had to be handed over without delay to anyone who comes along. And every time I can, I preach in my church of *Mexico City*, I invite the good people to submit to authority and humbly to solicit the comforts of slavery, even if I have to present it as true freedom (pp. 136 and 137).

Law, then, is nothing but a means to enslave men.

Intimately linked with his understanding of freedom and law is Clamence's basic outlook on life and on death. Speaking of the contradictions of his life and actions, he remarks:

I have never been really able to believe that human affairs were serious matters. I had no idea where the serious might lie, except that it was not in all this I saw around me—which seemed to me merely an amusing game, or tiresome (pp. 86 and 87).

If the cosmos lacks order and law, how can one help but see human actions as haphazard and arbitrary, convictions and ideals as rules of a game? Clamence

has only one source of meaning in his life and that is himself. Things and persons emerge out of this chaos only when they become related to his interests and good pleasure.

The meaninglessness of life is summarized for Clamence in one word: death. Death was the absolute end of the road, the supreme abuse facing every man who yearns for life. Measured by this destructive force, how could any effort, any distinction of good or bad have any meaning? Clamence accepted death bitterly, but he also went on to accept all that he thought death implied—the negation of any and all conventions, laws, and intellectual systems, the negation of human happiness itself. His acts of ridicule and cruelty, and finally his life as a judge-penitent are direct results of this acceptance.

Yet Clamence could not deny or destroy the feeling of guilt, this loathing for himself that stung him wherever he went. It is difficult for the reader to understand how, if there are no laws, one could be guilty, for guilt results from the knowledge of some evil action, and evil can be judged only by some norm or law. But that contradiction lies at the very heart of Clamence's anguish; this self-judgement, this guilt that hunted him down every alley is pronounced without a law, and this is the unendurable. As Clamence put it:

He who clings to a law does not fear the judgement that reinstates him in an order he believes in. But the keenest of human torments is to be judged without a law. Yet we are in that torment (p. 117).

Hence the symbolism of Clamence's possession of the stolen painting of "The Just Judges"—the righteous men who had the traditional power of pronouncing judgement have disappeared from society. Therefore no one can claim any longer the right to judge.

Thus it is that Clamence finds freedom unbearable. "At the end of freedom is a court sentence"—imposed usually by others, certainly by oneself. The solution is to find a law to which he can submit himself and be released, apparently, from the responsibility of free action. But there is no such law at the present, and none appears on the horizon. Indeed, the reader may ask how a law is possible since law can only come from another man, and who will this man be, if all men are guilty? Clamence does not ask this, although an implicit awareness of it may be a further cause of his present anguish. While waiting for the law, however, he must somehow get by in the present, somehow survive this oppressive guilt. This he does by becoming a quasi-law unto himself. By setting himself up as an example of human guilt he forces others, by his rhetoric, to admit their own guilt, thus allowing himself once more to dominate all other men—in fine, allowing himself everything again, "and without the laughter this time."

The character of Jean-Baptiste Clamence may not seem very appealing after this dissection: a lonely, tortured, selfish man whose one aim and 'happiness' in life is to reduce everyone else to his own misery. His actions are logical enough; in point of fact, they are logical unto death. Clamence also possesses an undercurrent of purity and sincerity which flickers in his spontaneous descriptions of the beauty of nature and the longing to find a meaning and permanence in life. At the end we suspect that his heart longs for a second chance to save the girl, but his intellectual cynicism and fear of another failure cause him to exclaim, "it is too late."

### III

Clamence proposes, in one way or another, his personal solutions to the problems of friendship, freedom, law, the meaning of life and death, of guilt and judgement. Camus, in his clear-sighted indictment of nihilism in *The Rebel*, presents his own answers to these questions raised by and embodied in the character of Clamence. The answers do not always diametrically clash with Clamence's but they frequently manifest a broader viewpoint, a middle position to the 'all-or-nothing' demands of Clamence. This broad viewpoint stems fundamentally from Camus' understanding of the nature of revolt.

Like Clamence, Camus is a rebel, a rebel against death and injustice. But his rebellion, while partly negative, reveals a profoundly positive character in its affirmation of a basic dignity and value in man that must always be defended. For a man to rebel means that he has been pushed too far, that the oppression and degradation forced upon him from without have become unbearable, have passed beyond a limit. Beyond the negative aspect of overthrowing oppression, the act of rebellion explodes into an affirmation of the dignity of the human person. But to assert the basic dignity of one person is to assert the dignity of a nature common to all men. If one man rebels against the insults to his human nature, he rebels, at least implicitly, for all men, for his rebellion implies the unity of all men in a common nature which demands to be held inviolable. Rebellion, then, constitutes the central principle for all of Camus' philosophy; it is his *cogito*. "Rebellion is the common ground on which every man bases his first values. I *rebel*—therefore we *exist*" (*The Rebel*, p. 28). With this as the guiding principle, we can progress to Camus' understanding of friendship, freedom, law, the meaning of life and death, of guilt and judgement, and show how they compare with Clamence's statements.

The common value of human nature in all men posits at least the beginning for and an orientation towards friendship and love. In *The Myth of Sisyphus*

Camus presents libertinism in the person of Don Juan, not as an ideal to be followed, but merely as a sketch of a certain style of life. Camus' earlier tendencies toward quantitative love and pleasure seem to change in his later writings toward qualitative and altruistic love and friendship. In *The State of Siege*, a play which Camus once said is, of all his writings, the one that most resembles him, he has the Chorus of Women comment, "Surely, since everything may not be saved, we should learn at least to safeguard the home where love is." In any case, the groundwork for love and friendship is provided in the dignity of human nature—a friend would at least respect the longings in the heart of the other, and love would have the solid ground of a shared destiny and value to build on. For Clamence, however, love is but a masquerade of selfishness and animal desire.

Closely allied to his understanding of human nature is Camus' understanding of freedom. Unlike Clamence, he would assert that freedom, the most perfect expression of which is found in the act of rebellion, is not only possible but necessary for human life. Just as rebellion, however, must never betray the human nature which it defends by subjugating it to any absolutes, so freedom must also respect the limits imposed by the demands of human nature. In this regard, Camus parts company with Jean-Paul Sartre who claims an absolute freedom for the individual. In Camus' eyes we are free, but within limits. The nihilist claims absolute freedom or absolute slavery because of his longing for totality and logic, and if everything is logical, then everything is justified. Death negates the law, therefore everything is possible. Camus asserts a middle position: life, not death is his concern. Man possesses the present moment not to lament his fate that will end with death, but to fulfill the demands of his human craving for unity and happiness. This craving will never be sufficiently fulfilled because of the absurdity of life, and therefore rebellion never ceases. But the rebel does alleviate his position by creating partial order in himself and in the universe. The rebellion of Clamence, on the other hand, is completely negative. His present position as judge-penitent asserts the unity of men in their guilt, not in the positive value of their nature. The future which he prophesied is a future of slavery, for Clamence lives in the nihilist world of all-or-nothing, absolute freedom or complete slavery.

Camus looks on law and intellectual systems as the agents of death and tyranny. He shows how rebellions in the past have overturned one oppressor, and in their turn have set up some other absolute goal and law in order to shape history according to their own viewpoints. The logical attainment of these goals or ideals allows for the subjection of all other lesser values, even the value of human dignity itself. This results in logical murder, the horrors

of which we have witnessed from the time of the French Revolution to the twentieth century mass murders in Germany and Russia. Camus, therefore, like Clamence, opposes absolute law, but with a difference: ideologies, dogmas and totalitarian systems are to be rejected, to be sure, but there *is* a law—the law of human nature which affirms the metaphysical basis of human solidarity, to which any attempt at collective unity must be subjected. Camus himself never defines explicitly what he means by human nature, but allows it to be defined in relation to the concrete situation. It is, however, closely linked with the intellectual drive of each individual toward unity and innocence. Thus there are 'limits' to human actions, even to the logical process of the mind itself. Murder may be logical, but it is wrong because it passes beyond the limits set by the demands of human nature. Logic itself must submit to life, to the living human being, and this is the stumbling block for Clamence.

Although Camus agrees with Clamence in asserting the ultimate unintelligibility of the world, nevertheless their conclusions tend in different directions. Camus at least accepts facts that confront him, e.g., the yearning of the mind for understanding, the desirability of life over death, the aptitude of the heart to respond to beauty. Clamence, however, looks upon life as a game. True, he can appreciate the beauty and purity of a fresh snowfall, but this only occasions more cynicism over the uselessness of it all. It is this attitude that Camus censures in *The Rebel*: "If nihilism is the inability to believe, then its most serious symptom is not found in atheism, but in the inability to believe in what is, to see what is happening and to live life as it is offered" (p. 59).

For Camus the encounter between the yearning for full and unified life and the certainty but incomprehensibility of death results in the absurd. For him, as for Clamence, death negates all human absolutes, it is the end of everything. His answer is to revolt against death and reject it with all his strength by a more intense life. Just as a condemned man who has two hours to live sees these two hours of life as the most precious reality he possesses, so Camus would have us understand the enormous value of the present moment. Do not, he would say, take up your time complaining about death or fearing its impending possibility; what we can be sure about is what we have in the present moment—fill *that* to the brim instead of looking questioningly into the future. Clamence, on the other hand, rebelled at the aspect of death by living death's logical negation of all human values and turning life into a premature death.

Logically consequent to Camus' 'freedom within limits' would be his position on sin, injustice and guilt. In one of his earliest essays, "Summer in Algiers,"



Camus remarks in reference to the Algerians, "There are words that I have never quite understood, like that of sin. I think I know, however, that those men have not sinned against life." In his later works, however, Camus, or at least his characters, seem to understand the nature of sin, e.g., Caligula and Cherea in the play, *Caligula*; the judge and his wife in *The State of Siege*; Tarrou in the novel, *The Plague*. In *The Rebel*, Camus admits human guilt and accuses any man of injustice who violates the limits of human nature. Thus suicide, murder, totalitarian oppression and even religious ideologies are unjustified in so far as they play false to the needs of human nature, two essentials of which are life and freedom. Camus implicitly admits the guilt of every man in this doctrine, since in an absurd world without meaningful norms, one must eventually injure his neighbor, if only by oversight and unintentional indifference. This guilt, however, does not seem to approach the metaphysical dimensions that it occupies in Kafka's understanding of human nature. Camus appears to treat human guilt as he treats death: he is aware of its menace, but he is more concerned with the positive side of living. All men are guilty, and some much more than others. Yet the craving for genuine innocence and lucidity at the center of every man outweighs his sins, some of which are committed in the name of innocence and truth. This basic optimism in Camus' understanding of man is diametrically opposed to Clamence's pessimism. Again, Clamence was obsessed with one aspect of human nature. Since he must lie under the condemnation imposed by himself upon his sins, as well as the condemnation imposed by death upon his very existence, he chooses the one way open to an unredeemably guilty man—to live his life of guilt to the extreme of logic and impose this way of life on others. What results is a world of continuous depression, mirrored in the mist and opaqueness of the Amsterdam landscape.

This brief comparison between the philosophy of the author and that of his creation, Clamence, should serve to point up the similarities and divergencies between them. At this point it seems clear that the character of Clamence is not a fictional representation of the mind of Camus. What purpose, then, did Camus have in mind when he wrote *The Fall*? The theory we propose is based on a study of his principal work, *The Rebel*, as well as the characteristic atmosphere permeating his other works.

#### IV

When considering the great philosophical novelists in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, Camus remarks:



But in fact the preference they have shown for writing in images rather than in reasoned arguments is revelatory of a certain thought that is common to them all, convinced of the uselessness of any principle of explanation and sure of the educative message of perceptible appearances (p. 75).

In *The Fall* Camus assumes the role of educator and his text book is the character of Jean-Baptiste Clamence. In Clamence, Camus has created a modern Hamlet, with, of course, the necessary alterations. The Hamlet of Shakespeare defies a simple definition because he plays several roles at different times within the play. His acting, moreover, is self-conscious. Realizing that he too is contaminated with the rottenness of Denmark, he seeks a solution in ritual, in the drama itself. The play's the thing. His tragedy lies in the failure of the acting and ritual to accomplish the abolition of evil, although he does bring the evil to light. Clamence reveals himself as a consummate actor when he admits toward the end that he plays different roles each time, adapting himself to form a mirror of the listener. The play is the thing wherein he catches the conscience of everyman. Clamence claims the occupation of a Parisian lawyer. Does it not seem rather coincidental that his listener also practices law in Paris? At one point Clamence admits:

I know what you're thinking: it's very hard to disentangle the true from the false in what I'm saying. I admit you are right . . . But what do I care? Don't lies eventually lead to the truth? And don't all my stories, true or false, tend toward the same conclusion (p. 119)?

The conclusion of his mime is that at the heart of every man festers a private guilt.

Clamence, like Hamlet, manifests an intense complexity of character. Crisscrossing throughout his person are echoes of the nihilists of the past: Sade's monstrous will-to-power, Hegel's acceptance of evil as a necessary state of the dialectical progress toward ultimate Justice and Purity, Nietzsche's unbridled freedom with its accompanying heart-breaking loneliness and enigmatic quest for order. But unlike previous nihilists who defied the universal condemnation of man, Clamence cannot negate his private guilt. And this sense of guilt prevents him from loving himself, from allowing himself everything as a logical consequence of his nihilism. The laughter has stopped that. The only way he can negate his guilt and securely love himself again is by once more dominating other men, this time as judge-penitent. Admittedly a game, a ritual, this really does not free him from guilt, but guilt is easier to bear when one lives in a community of condemned men. Thus, *The Fall* becomes a complete mime, a play within a play in which the latter provides but a framework for the former.

This device has been used in a previous work of Camus', the play *Caligula*, to which *The Fall* bears a striking resemblance. The Emperor Caligula, convinced of the meaninglessness of life, plays the role of the gods, parodying their incomprehensible condemnations of men. By playing the game to its logical extremes, he subjects the citizens of Rome to ridiculous abuse in order to teach them the absurdity of their conventional lives and their belief in the gods. Clamence too plays at being God by pronouncing judgement on his clients, to teach them the torments of freedom and to prepare them for the slavery of the future. Both Caligula and Clamence are seeking for the 'moon' (a central image in the play, *Caligula*), that is to say, the ideal universe of absolute freedom and lucidity. Half-way measures or compromises they vehemently refuse. It will be all, or nothing. Since they cannot have the all, they choose nothingness, Caligula by destruction, Clamence by slavery.

What attitude, then, should the reader adopt toward Clamence and his life? One feels that Camus would have us side with Clamence in his rebellion against fate, against unjust judgements, conventions and absolute principles. Thus Camus truly employs the character of Clamence as a symbol by which he educates the superficial and self-righteous man. But as the perspective changes, one senses that Camus abandons Clamence as the judge-penitent pursues his logic to extremes. Clamence longs for an ideal state of absolute freedom and innocence, and since guilt and death render this impossible, he will follow the logical implications of this impossibility and embrace absolute slavery. Camus does not abandon Clamence in favor of the mediocre bourgeois, however. Rather, he wishes us to recognize a realm superior to the realm of thought—that realm of human order in which reign the truths of existence that are lived and not logically demonstrated. Again, life remains superior to logic. Both Caligula and Clamence try to impose a logical meaning on life, to make life an ideal dream world or, that failing, an absolute hell. Thus, in the tragedy of Clamence, the ritual achieves its end of pointing out the evil, but with a twist. On one level, Clamence's mime becomes a mirror of the guilt of other men. But on another, broader level, Clamence's mime turns back on himself and becomes a mirror of his own folly, and the folly of the Europe that still seeks after absolutes. Clamence's tragedy ends up in his own living death and the audience, with Camus, pronounces judgement on Clamence because he went beyond the limits of human nature. Camus would have us recognize Clamence's life as an extreme, thereby recognizing implicitly the limits of human nature. Hence his educative message in the symbolic character of Clamence.

*The Fall* presents the mad emperor of modern Europe, the 'hero of our times' who tends to consider an individual life as nothing compared to the

moon, that symbol of the ideal world of absolute logic. The pendulum of absolutes swings from one extreme to the other in Clamence's life. Absolute freedom becomes unendurable because of the torture of guilt and judgement without law, and therefore Clamence endorses absolute slavery. Man has fallen because he was free and now must needs surrender to the redemption of slavery. Camus is here indicting the Europe he takes to task in *The Rebel*:

The men of Europe, abandoned to the shadows, have turned their backs upon the fixed and radiant point of the present. They forget the present for the future, the fate of humanity for the delusion of power, the misery of the slums for the mirage of the Eternal City, ordinary justice for an empty promised land. They despair of personal freedom and dream of a strange freedom of the species; reject solitary death and give the name of immortality to a vast collective agony. They no longer believe in the things that exist in the world and in living man; the secret of Europe is that it no longer loves life. Its blind men entertain the puerile belief that to love one single day of life amounts to justifying whole centuries of oppression . . . Impatience with limits, the rejection of their double life, despair at being a man have finally driven them to inhuman excesses (p. 272).

In *The Fall*, then, Camus once again appeals to Europe to cease running away from life either by seeking for an ideal future, or by dragging along the oppressive guilt of the past. The Kingdom of Absolutes in whatever form is a dream. The renaissance of human value will spring from action in the present when men learn to accept life as they find it, with its pain, but also with its beauty, when they affirm a dignity and beauty common to all men, and when they extend this value to embrace everything in their advance toward unity.

*The Cranwell School*

*Lenox, Mass.*

## The New Barbarians

William G. Herron

The fate of twentieth century man is to live under the constant threat of annihilation. Every human becomes aware that his society found the key to the atom and thereby opened the door to his possible obliteration. The Beat Generation appear against this somber background. They assert that mid-twentieth century life can be adapted to only by withdrawing from the rules and values of contemporary society. They live with death as an immediate danger, divorce themselves from society, reject the past and the future, rebel against authority, and deride the conventional man. They are not moral, and this mitigates their potency, but the fact that they are in opposition to the prevailing cynicism and apathy of our society makes the Beats a significant social force. Disagreement with the Beat approach to living should not be equated with license to overlook or dismiss their protest against the imperfections of our culture. The Beats are a potential stimulus for the improvement of society. Their solution is, of itself, defeat, but the fact of their rebellion is what matters. This revolt is capable of instigating men to do something remedial about their society.

This potency for affecting society is demonstrated by appraising the development of the Beat movement. The phrase Beat Generation was coined by the novelist Jack Kerouac in the early post-war years. He applied it to himself and a group of his friends who he felt represented a complex of attitudes in American youth. These people were a group of adventurers who had learned the lesson of disillusionment of the Twenties, the Depression, and the World War. They shared a disbelief in what the majority revered: the single mate, the solid family, and the conventional success story. This group talked together and wrote much but published little (except in avant-garde publications like *Neurotica*, a journal "for and by neurotics"). In his first novel, *The Town and the City*, Kerouac described the underground world of the Beats that he had come to know in New York. This fiction had its counterpart in reality, with antecedents in such separate influences as Henry Miller, D. H. Lawrence, Dylan Thomas, Ezra Pound, Wilhelm Reich, and Hemingway's

Lost Generation. In addition to Kerouac some of the original Beats were Allen Ginsberg, a controversial poet, William Lee, an older man and a drug addict, Neil Cassidy, an exuberant seeker of experience, and Carl Solomon, who searched for the fragmentation of perception.

Within ten years the Beat Generation had been promulgated and the label had outgrown the original group. They were called Hipsters, Beats, Beatniks, and New Bohemians, though the theme of depression manifested in their existence is in sharp contrast to the ebullient Bohemian matrix that is their ancestor. The attitudes of the Beat Generation found increasing expression in the works of writers such as Norman Mailer, Nelson Algren, Clellon Holmes, Herbert Gold, Chandler Brossard, Vance Bourjaily, Anatole Broyard, George Mandel, and R. V. Cassill.

The Beat defiance of conventionality has resulted in sensationalism. This has had the unfortunate result of attracting a legion of ineffectual followers who know little of the purpose and philosophy of the Beats. These imitators specialize in the trappings of "being Beat." The males hurriedly grow a beard, while the females learn to scorn makeup except around the eyes. Both sexes talk mysteriously about Zen Buddhism, existentialism, and the art of disengagement. These superficialities are climaxed with a disregard for morality and an affinity for marijuana.

The small world of the Beats has a well-publicized existence. Major "cat" colonies can be found in San Francisco, Chicago, and Greenwich Village, where the College of Complexes sponsors an annual beauty contest to elect Miss Beatnik. The Beat Generation is principally a male society, with the males averaging 30 years of age and outnumbering, by three to one, the females who tend to be about seven years younger. Men and women often work in the conventional world and return to nocturnal Beatland. Some of the girls are married and bring up their children in the colonies, but most are described as "free-wheeling chicks with no cover charge."

In addition to the imitators who form the stereotype of the Beat, two other groups have evolved within the Beat movement. The first of these are fringe members who are in sympathy with the Beat rebellion but do not subscribe to utter nihilism or the destruction of most civilized values. Kenneth Rexroth, a successful poet who has been instrumental in establishing the literary potency of the Beat Generation, exemplifies this borderline affiliation.

The second of these subgroups is the Hipsters, the most advanced Beat type representing the extreme in Beat attitudes. Norman Mailer seems to exemplify this type of Beat, rejecting order, permanence, and continuity while

continually pursuing new experiences. The Hipster is the core of the Beat Generation. He speaks most authoritatively, most persuasively, and most ardently about the meaning of the Beat movement. In this sense, the Hipster is the Beat while the others, the imitators and the fringe members, represent a sympathetic audience who can at times be activated to follow the dictates of the Hipster.

The Beat Generation is committed to the present. Life is seen as perpetual anxiety in which marriage, work, organized religion, morality, and long term goals have lost their relevance. The focus is essentially autistic with the rest of the world held in derision. The Hipster wants to explore himself in terms of immediate experience, using relationships to find out about himself. Since he has no future, people do not matter to him except for the moment. The man who is Beat has a continual awareness that he is alone and his problem is to learn to live with this awareness. He accepts only one responsibility: "to sharpen his own senses so that he can continue and improve his dialogue with existence."

The language of this dialogue is one of implication, often crude yet pictorial in its ambiguity. It includes words with a vague denotation, such as beat, hip, swinging, and cool. This represents an attempt to describe moods and insights that in their complexity resist exact definition. The language of the Beats is another means of separation from the order of society. It depicts the world as the Beat sees it—elusive and continually changing.

The Beats cannot be considered purposeless because their purpose differs from that of the Squares in suburbia with their picture windows looking out at the house across the street. On the other hand it seems inaccurate for their advocates to call the Beats moral. They are committed to immorality as part of experience, though an inept hipster may be moral, just as Squares are moral on paper but not always in fact. The purpose of the Beats is to conduct a search with experience as a warrant and sex, drugs, jazz, and insanity as the chief detectives. It seems that they are searching for a God who is the essence of a mystical, undefined love, and who is divorced from perceptual reality. This God is most apparent in the sainthood of madness or the transcendental passage on a marijuana ship. Experience has to be lived through, and somehow, by the very intensity of the living, a step must be taken beyond it into a gossamer realm. This is the spiritual quality of the Beat Generation, but with a narcissistic ethic.

Also, this God is a coward, usually in hiding and very resistive to discovery. It seems that his crucifixion was his major retreat and he has remained hidden, though the Beats look for him in the dregs of human



experience. They assert that the Squares have looked elsewhere, we will look here. However, they are unsuccessful searchers forced to conclude that God is at the mercy of man's bondage. God is impotent because man killed him. In the closing minutes of Beckett's play, *Waiting for Godot*, with an implied equation between Godot and God, one character asks another what Godot does. The answer is: "He does nothing, Sir."

Still, the Beats keep looking for God, asking questions about him and frequently humanizing him. In *On the Road*, Kerouac ascribes divinity to two jazz artists, Slim Gaillard and George Shearing, and ultimately asks: ". . . and don't you know that God is Pooh Bear?" The preoccupation with God is also exemplified in Kerouac's character descriptions. In *The Subterraneans*, Julien Alexander is described as "the angel of the subterraneans" and as "Christlike." Dean Moriarty, in *On the Road*, is called a "saint."

Society has been made aware of the Beat approach to life mainly through the creative efforts of the Beat Generation. The verbal arts represent the source of most of their creativity. In painting, the plastic arts, and music they are primarily receptive. Beat art is described as "a personal cultivation, not much different from finger painting." In the music field they worship jazz, particularly the distilled versions of the remains of bop, originally fostered by Charley "Bird" Parker, Thelonius Monk, Dizzy Gillespie, Mel Roach and Miles Davis.

Their productivity is greatest in the novel and poetic forms. Jack Kerouac is certainly their leading novelist. His first novel, *The Town and the City*, was published in 1950. It is reminiscent of the work of Thomas Wolfe. It was not particularly successful, but Rexroth described the author as "in his small way the peer of Celine, Destouches, or Beckett . . . the most famous 'unpublished' author in America."

His second novel was *On the Road*, published seven years later. Changing his style and his theme, Kerouac wrote a best-seller which disturbed people because of its autobiographical approach. This meant that there really were people with high IQs who made a career out of bumming around the country, saying: "Now, man, I know you're probably real bugged," and "Dig her, that little gone black lovely."

Kerouac has also written *The Subterraneans*, *Dharma Bums*, *Doctor Sax*, *Tristessa*, and *Maggie Cassidy*. He writes in what is termed "spontaneous prose." Kerouac's description of this is: "Satisfy yourself first, then reader cannot fail to receive telepathic shock and meaning—excitement by same laws operating in his own human mind."



Kerouac has been called "an undisciplined Thomas Wolfe," with "streaks of fierce poetry" in his writing. Kenneth Rexroth asserts: "We've just got to realize that we have another Thomas Wolfe on our hands, a great writer totally devoid of good sense." In reference to Kerouac, Henry Miller states: "a passionate lover of language, he knows how to use it." Allen Ginsberg calls him, "A gentle, intelligent, suffering prose saint."

However, Moore asserts: "It's hard to imagine Kerouac being read in the far future for anything except sociology." Podhoretz states that "the prose of *The Subterraneans* . . . sounds like an inept parody of Faulkner at his worst." Lipton, in *The Holy Barbarians*, attacks Kerouac's *The Dharma Bums* for containing "too much of Hallelujah I'm a Buddha."

Other beat writers include Chandler Brossard, whose first novel, *Who Walk in Darkness*, was among the earliest works dealing with the hipster; Anatole Broyard, who wrote "Sunday Dinner in Brooklyn," "What the Cystoscope Said," and other stories, and who lectures at the New School for Social Research; R. V. Cassill, an M.A. from the University of Iowa, who wrote *Eagle on the Coin*; Clellon Holmes, who wrote *Go*; William Lee, the author of *Junkie*; and George Mandel, author of *Flee the Angry Strangers*. These writers tend to be autobiographical, blunt, and wordy. In contrast to their Bohemian predecessors they are rarely humorous. Beat humor is principally a square production. Despite enthusiasm by some critics for the writings of these Beats, Moore presents the generally accepted belief that so far the Beats' novels have not been good enough to survive. Even Lipton is fairly discouraging about these writers, except for Kerouac.

According to Rexroth, the critical picture is more promising in poetry. The Beat poets emphasize simplicity and immediate personal communication. While not trying to say anything new they remain extremely individualistic and very conscious of their social role.

This new poetry, "simple, sensuous, and passionate," began appearing after World War II in avant-garde "little magazines" such as *Origin*, *Black Mountain Review*, *Jargon*, and *Golden Goose*. This inception originated in San Francisco, as did the oral presentation of poetry often combined with jazz. Rexroth contends that these poetry recitations have been "fabulously successful," but there are contrary opinions, as that of Rolontz in the *Jazz Review*.

Denise Levertov is considered the best of these new poets. Rexroth calls her "the most subtly skillful poet of her generation, the most modest, the most moving." Other new generation poets are Robert Creeley, Charles Olson, Philip Lamantia, Brother Antonius, Robert Duncan, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Barbara

Guest, Kenneth Koch, Frank O'Hara, James Broughton, Gregory Corso, and the very controversial Allen Ginsberg. These poets owe a great deal to the influence of Ezra Pound, Dylan Thomas, and William Carlos Williams. Qualitatively, they cannot be equated with the classical modernists of American verse, but their poetry has become very popular. Apparently these poets are saying things people want to hear.

The proven ability of Beat writers to reach an audience is a powerful argument in favor of the possible stimulus value of the Beat movement. This has been reflected in positive critical comment. Malaquis in *Reflections on Hip* calls them "the only significant new group of rebels in America." Feldman and Gartenberg, in *The Beat Generation and the Angry Young Men*, claim the Beats are "the advance columns of a vast moral revolution." They assert that the infiltration of Beat attitudes into literary expression has been "one of the most positive developments in American letters in the last two decades. They have brought new vigor to American writing." Paul Goodman, in *Growing Up Absurd*, lauds the Beats for achieving "a simpler fraternity, animality and sexuality than we have had, at least in America, in a long, long time."

In contrast, Podhoretz, in the *Partisan Review*, called the Beats "The Know-Nothing Bohemians." Moore, in *Garrets and Pretenders*, describes them as "in the main anti-intellectual." Polsky, in *Reflections on Hip*, states: "The new Bohemia's inferiority shows up clearly in its lack of intellectual content. Most hipsters scarcely read at all . . . Their own literary productions are few, and what there are of them . . . have almost no literary merit whatever."

The Beats have difficulty making converts because their behavior often appears contradictory; existentialism and Zen Buddhism are strange bedfellows. Also, in decrying the conformity of the Squares, the Beats have their own conformity which is equally binding. Inconsistencies such as these cast some doubt on the sincerity and clarity of their endeavors. In addition, Polsky maintains that their influence is limited because they are more psychologically crippled than most people. There is considerable evidence to support this assertion.

While there is disagreement about the value of the creative efforts of the Beat Generation, it is apparent that they are reaching a large group of people. Also, there can be no doubt that an impact on society arises from the hard-core Hipsters rejecting past and future, rebelling against authority, conventionality, and morality, and despising the Square. They often burden society with their apparent and admitted pathology. Mailer considers the Hipster a "philosophical psychopath" who wears his neurosis proudly. This psychopathic endeavor involves the seduction of the conscience by immediate gratification. At the

same time, reality relationships are disrupted by anxiety, leaving narcissistic beings parasitical to a society they despise. They often "act out" the superficialities of rebellion, but they seem to change very little in our society because the possibility exists that these are rebels through madness, not choice.

Yet the Beat movement cannot be dismissed, because it has the potency for effect. The extreme protest of the Beat Generation, Ginsberg's *Howl*, begins:

I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed  
by madness, starving hysterical naked,  
dragging themselves through the negro streets  
at dawn looking for an angry fix,  
angelheaded hipsters burning for the ancient  
heavenly connection to the starry dynamo  
in the machinery of night,  
who poverty and tatters and hollow eyed and  
high sat up smoking in the supernatural  
darkness of cold-water flats floating  
across the tops of cities contemplating  
jazz, . . .

If this protest disturbs its listeners, if it makes them answer rather than hide in the sterility of passive conformity, then we can all return to searching for God in the usual places and saying to those we call friend, "coward, take this coward's hand."

*St. Bonaventure University*

## Reviews

*The Unconscious in History.* By A. Bronson Feldman. New York: Philosophical Library. 1959; pp. 269. \$4.75.

The challenge posed by the contemporary description of psychoanalysis as "successful error" has led a number of the analytically oriented to investigate experimental verification of Freudian hypotheses. Freud recognized that the survival of his theory was vested in such verification, but some of his disciples, the "we Freudians" group, ignore this challenge. The present series of essays on unconscious motivation in historical characters exemplifies this blind faith in the hypothetical. The purpose of such writing appears to be the perpetuation of successful error through inference. The first essay, described by the publishers as a "contribution to analytic theology," could be accurately depicted as mythology viewed through monocular eyes persisting in the illusion that they see depth. The initial irritant for the reader is the generous employment of a device known as quoting out of context. The irritation is reinforced by use of dubious authority figures. The culmination is the author's creation of a false problem to which

a series of improbable speculations are advanced as answers. The second essay is more hopeful, since the author admits that he does not know the motive for at least one person's madness. However, after completing this essay on image-breaking, the reader is forced to entertain the thought that perhaps regression, rather than sublimation, is the "successful" defense. The development of various symbols, discussed in the third group of essays, appears to be of theoretical value, despite the author's uncritical journey across the bridge of validation into the land of factual acceptance. Is it not possible that some motive other than castration anxiety motivated Lincoln to preserve the Union? Would not the early settlers of this country have been forced to "ravish the land with ox and rifle and plow" whether or not they had "deep feelings of masculine deficiency?" Is there not some possibility that people build skyscrapers for reasons other than anxiety? In contrast to the preceding essays the fourth group of writings contains a remarkably lucid, critical, and detailed account of various theories which have been advanced to explain the psychology of nations. The mood is set, perhaps unintentionally, by a quote from

Ernest Jones. "Perhaps it would be wiser never to enter the thorny field of national psychology without surrounding oneself with reservations."

While the author's conclusions that, "all the nations are siblings struggling for a coveted place in the sun at the breast of Mother Earth," is more figurative than conclusive, nonetheless, in these essays there is an attempt carefully to examine other explanations. The fifth essay involves a return to reductionism which is complicated by a flight from clarity.

The pursuit of figurative writing is manifested in such phrases as "an offshoot of forlorn fugitive apes," and, "they greet the phallus contact as a substitute for ego embrace." The author coins a new term where none is needed and presents, with devastating certainty, the sadistic origin of economic structure, particularly capitalism. The writer blandly mentions that: "Excretion . . . appears to be costly for the soul." The reader can only be amazed at his use of the word "soul" in this context. The soul is later translated as the "dream-self" to relieve reader anxiety, which is immediately increased by learning that the "divine wind . . . is at bottom the bowel breath, whose motion gives the primitive mind . . . aggression which unconsciously compares with heavenly thunder." This artistic pedantry is blatantly presented in the same chapter in which scientists are urged to "stop ransacking Freud and really take stock in his science." In the

final essay the author states; "Well, suppose we grant the fundamental pulses of history are libidinal." Suppose we do not grant this. Then it becomes difficult to find a reason for reading this essay. The hope of proof for the author's contention is one incentive, but this is entangled with the reiteration of the statement.

"Every generation of mankind undergoes . . . the same essentially sexual struggle that humanity experienced after its genesis." Variations on this theme involve contentions that "All great revolutions seem to be started by women." The author's style is a mixture of "the peril of the mother's inward grasping genitals with their suggestion of bloody metamorphosis," with "come to think of it," and, "this fact, plain as sunlight." Ambivalence of style is paralleled by ambivalence of thought. Complexity is the main manifestation, but simplicity has its moment, as in the author's explanation of evolution. "Repression of incestuous and genicidal desire made our forbears part company with the apes." Eventually the author tires of his theme, stating: "Oedipus complex,

Oedipus complex! Is there no other way to explain the rises and falls of the human races?" If the reader is hopeful, it is a false hope. After mentioning that homosexuality is the basis for royalty and indicating that most of history presents the image of child slaughter, the author humbly admits that his description of the dynamics of guilt is "speculative

mythology." These words, prefaced by "interesting," accurately depict most of the book.

St. Bonaventure University

WILLIAM G. HERRON

*The Journals and Papers of Gerard House* and completed by Graham Storey. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959; pp. xxxii and 579. \$15.00. *The Sermons and Devotional Writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, edited by Christopher Devlin, S.J. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959; pp. xiv and 370. \$6.75.

Long-awaited by students of Victorian literature, "modern" poetry, and religious trends in nineteenth-century England, these two handsome volumes will be greeted with enthusiasm tempered only by the mildest of regrets. The enthusiasm stems from the first publication of new and valuable material concerning Hopkins; the regrets from the expensiveness of the two volumes as well as from the fact that in time still another edition of *The Journals and Papers* will be necessary.

These two volumes represent an important expansion of Humphry House's edition of *The Note-books and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins* (1937), an expansion necessitated by the recent recovery of a number of Hopkins' manuscripts. As a result of

these recoveries and House's decision to print in full the poet-priest's religious writings, we have added materially to our knowledge of Hopkins' mind, vocation, and art.

Reading the "Early Diaries" (1862-6) and the "Journal" (1866-75) sections, one is able to trace Hopkins' spiritual journey from Anglicanism to Catholicism, the growth of his poetic technique, his ever-accurate eye for natural beauty ("The water running down the lasher violently swells in a massy wave against the opposite bank, which, to resist its force, is defended by a piece of brick wall. The shape of wave of course bossy, smooth and globy. Full of bubble and air, very liquid.—For the rest of the lasher, all except the shoulder where it first sweeps over it is covered with a kind of silver links. Running like a wind or element at the shoulder."), his unflagging interest in the sounds, origins, and associations of words ("Drill, trill, thrill, nostril, nese-thirl [Wiclif etc.] Common idea piercing. To drill, in a sense of discipline, is to wear down, work upon. Cf. to bore in slang sense, wear, grind. So tire connected with *tero*.") The "Undergraduate Essays" are perhaps not intrinsically worthy of publication, but they show a mind remarkably well-developed even for a Balliol scholar.

Mr. Storey is, I believe, too modest when he writes that he has fallen short of Humphry House's high editing standards, for the notes to this

volume are full, pointed, and pithy. In a few cases—e.g., “bones sleeved in flesh” (p. 72) and “as if it were the earth that flung them” (p. 206)—he has failed to note the parallels with Hopkins’ poems, but these are minor slips indeed. One questions, however, the inclusion of appendixes on “Hopkins as Musician” and “Philosophical Notes” not because they are not in themselves valuable, but because they are neither definitive nor complete. For my part, they should have been printed in scholarly journals, the space thus saved devoted to the unpublished variants of Hopkins’ early verse.

The wisdom of having Christopher Devlin, S.J., edit *The Sermons and Devotional Writings* is apparent. The meticulousness, grace, and special knowledge he brings to the task are impressive; he elucidates the text and points out Hopkins’ theological strengths and weaknesses impartially, even though some will disagree that its interest is more intrinsic than personal (p. xiv). In this volume we can find elucidation of the so-called “terrible sonnets,” the formation of Hopkins’ typical compounds (“hard-nailed,” p. 19; “selflove,” p. 51), and the reasons for Hopkins’ failure as a popular preacher. Concerning this last, one can imagine the dismay of his Liverpool congregation at hearing sermons based upon the analysis of Biblical texts worthy of an explicator of modern poetry. The preacher seems really to have been unable to gauge

the intellectual capacities of his hearers.

And yet on occasion Hopkins’ sermons are most effective, even beautiful in parts; e.g., the sermon beginning “The Gospel from the Sermon on the Mount, that river of divine wisdom, which rising on Christ’s lips flows from that mountain down all time to the sweetest refreshment of those who will come to taste it and live by it.” On the whole, however, Hopkins was unsuccessful as a preacher. His hearers complained both to him and to his superiors of his ineffectiveness, and he himself was painfully aware that his sermons did not always move. In a note which is at once both pathetic and semi-humorous, Hopkins writes:

The sermon . . . was on our Lord’s fondness for praising and rewarding people. I thought people must be quite touched by this consideration and that I even saw some wiping their eyes, but when the same thing happened next week I perceived that it was hot and that it was sweat they were wiping away. (p. 81)

This aspect of Hopkins’ life accounts, in part, for his thinking himself “Time’s eunuch,” one who “not breeds one work that wakes.”

It is, perhaps, bootless to complain of the the expensiveness of these volumes, printing costs being what they are; but the student who purchased the 1937 *Note-books* at \$8.50 will be disappointed to know that these books



will, despite their cost, be superseded by a fuller edition some day. And yet no student of Hopkins can afford to do without these most valuable volumes.

St. Bonaventure University

BOYD LITZINGER

*D. H. Lawrence: The Failure and the Triumph of Art*, by Eliseo Vivas. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1960; pp. 302. \$4.75.

When a critic of the stature of Eliseo Vivas undertakes a full length study of D. H. Lawrence, the reviewer finds it difficult to decide which is of greater significance, Vivas with his critical standards or Lawrence with his novels. The problem is greater when the subtitle is like this one, *The Failure and the Triumph of Art*, for it suggests that the importance of the work exhausts the limits of mere Lawrence study and participates in the more universal province of general aesthetics.

However, despite the overtones of a treatise in aesthetics, the study is chiefly of D. H. Lawrence and scholars concerned more with novels than criticism will find adequate material of interest. This is a study of Lawrence mainly, and Vivas addresses himself to the evaluation and illumination of that author's contribution to letters. The book, as the title suggests, is a

split analysis: partly a discussion of the novelist's failures, partly his triumphs.

The failures, as Vivas sees them, are *Aaron's Rod*, *Kangaroo*, *The Plumed Serpent*, and *Lady Chatterley's Lover*.

Not many will disagree with his evaluation of *Kangaroo* or *Lady Chatterley*, but when he attacks *Aaron's Rod* as "the worst of his novels," and *The Plumed Serpent* as "unpleasant and defective," he has set himself against the high priests who see both works as extremely important, seminal to Lawrence studies. This does not frighten him as he accuses Lawrence of sloppiness, padding, lack of inventiveness, incoherence, carelessness, straining, cuteness, and so on. The opposition is obviously Middleton Murry, Nehls, Leavis, Jessie Chambers Wood, whose approach is chiefly biographical-historical, focused on the novels as reflections of Lawrence's life or his philosophical development. Vivas examines these novels as art, or as he says, "poetry." Through this approach he finds the works defective as against those which express themselves in "constitutive symbols," the *sine qua non* of art to Vivas and the neo-Kantians.

But Vivas is not only interested in symbols and forms; this study to be thorough (which it is) must come to grasp with Lawrence's philosophy, the "metaphysic of 'the blood.'" In his extended treatment of *The*

*Plumed Serpent*, Vivas moderates Bertrand Russell's condemnation of Lawrence's philosophy as fascism, but goes on himself to attack the intellectual substance of the book as ethically unreal in its denial of the cohesive nature of man. He scores heavily the divisive arrogance of Lawrencian thought which exalts personal blood knowledge over the human, communal ethic.

But in the second half of the study Vivas asserts that Lawrence is one of the greatest artists in our tradition and perhaps the greatest creator of the twentieth century consciousness. In chapters on *Sons and Lovers*, *The Rainbow*, and *Women in Love*, he draws out his theory of Lawrence's triumph as an artist, or as he prefers, a poet. In this section Vivas' particular aesthetic with its demands are most in evidence.

To Vivas, triumphant art is poetry of the highest order, "not mere transcription, mere reportage," of experience but experience itself. The utility of art is that "we do not see the world reflected in it, we see the world by means of it." Art is "more than an imitation or reflection of what exists; it is literally an addition."

For an exposition of Vivas' development of these ideas into the theory of "constitutive symbols" the most helpful parts of the book are those bracketing sections: the Introduction, "The Two Lawrences"; and the Appendix, "The Constitutive Symbol."

The chapters on *Women in Love* serve best to illustrate this aesthetic in practice. It seems in these pages one finds the most significant contribution of the study.

The approach which Vivas follows is made up of two sources: the symbol as understood by the followers of Cassirer, and best expressed today by Suzanne Langer; and attitudes toward literature expressed by Lawrence in his *Studies in Classic American Literature*, and an essay, "The Novel," from *Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine*. The object of condemnation is discursive art which comments on rather than embodies reality.

The approach is obviously romantic with its references to the organic nature of a work of art, creative imagination being the unassailable faculty of artistic production. Imitation comes off second best to creation. In Lawrence's typical overstatement, "phallic worship" must triumph over philosophy, or at least philosophic discourse. Art is basically Dionysian with Apollo so transformed, or as Vivas says "transubstanced," that he is revealed as Dionysus in disguise.

To label this critical method as "romantic" is not to condemn. In fact for the study of works of art of the past century or two, this method is helpful, even necessary. No classical method could approach the level of analysis which Vivas undertakes. In fact, I suspect that free of some of the romantic terms with, their ingrown

presuppositions, Vivas method could be most revealing in its approach to any literature. However, as it stands in the book it seems to have a definitely limited predication.

In illustration of this is the early section in which Lawrence's failures are discussed. One need but review section 6 of the *Sons and Lovers* chapter to note that when Vivas is brought to the position of pointing artistic weaknesses in novels he relies less on the critical apparatus of the "constitutive symbol." The major points he registers against *Kangaroo* and the other failures are more those found as weaknesses by Dr. Johnson than by Ernst Cassirer.

But what he has to say about the "constitutive symbol" as against the quasi-symbol is most effective, clear and provocative. However, I wonder, and I think Mr. Vivas would too, whether this type of criticism fits well into normative situations such as determining failures. A further consideration is whether normative criticism has much to do with aesthetics, except in the simplest manner. Can the aesthetic of the "constitutive symbol" help in establishing artistic failures or is it useful only in determining the better work of art, not the defective one? Vivas' use of it shows that this may well be the case.

However, whatever the limits of this method which Vivas employs, in those places where it can be brought to the aid of the reader and critic,

no one can deny that the art is illuminated, more fully understood, and significantly experienced through it. Through this method, the work of art and the reality in which it participates is revealed in a way which would be impossible without it. In a sense, what Vivas says in conclusion about Lawrence can be applied on the critical level to Vivas' approach to art. "Lawrence has made it possible for those who read him critically to understand aesthetically, to grasp in the mode of immediate apprehension aspects of our contemporary world that, had he left them uninformed, would have remained for us mere threatening oppressive chaos. He charts our world. Without him and the other poets who also chart it, we would be likely to be blind to the specific process of disintegration of which we are victims."

College of the Holy Cross

EDWARD F. CALLAHAN

*Education*, by Immanuel Kant (translated by Annette Churton). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1960; pp. 121. \$1.35.

It was in 1803, the year before Kant's death, that his student, Rink, collected, organized, and first published the loose notes which Kant had used 28 and 18 years earlier as his point of departure in lecturing on

pedagogics, here translated as *Education*.

Before taking his turn lecturing on the education of children and adolescents Kant had ample opportunity to learn at first hand of its problems, of its effects on contemporary society and on students at the university level. He had served nine years as private tutor of children in a few cultivated families near Koenigsberg and another 20 as instructor at the university in a variety of scientific and philosophical areas. He observed that existing education was content to prepare youth for a place in a world unconcerned with human dignity, but without any idea of improving it; and that the universities, by producing learned men who were neither intelligent nor reasonable, sent "more insipid men out into the world than any other class of the general public." Clearly something had to be done with children and youth to make them conscious of their inherent dignity and worth, so that they might help to create a world in which that dignity could be developed to its fullest. Basedow's pedagogical laboratory, an institute called the *Philanthropinum*, struck him as having great promise. He approved its experimental approach for two reasons: so little was known about the means by which character could be developed, and experimentation would lead to the elimination of inappropriate means. For this reason also education should be in the hands of experts,

rather than of parents or the state, and to escape the latter's short-sighted or selfish influence Kant proposed that education should be supported by voluntary contributions. Not content just to talk about these things, he undertook to raise funds for the Dessau institute from the general public.

It is interesting to reflect that the self-respect and mutual respect which Kant made the heart of education, which called for such arduous self-conquest as he proposed and for such a radical change of outlook and methods in contemporary German education, are described by Raymond Firth as prevailing without strain in the way of life natural to the so-called primitive Tikopia in the South Pacific. In Kant's world they needed to be justified and struggled for, against the weight of custom and tradition. His justification took the form of his all (tradition)-crushing Critical Philosophy, and his struggle went to the length of exercising his academic privilege of publishing a work for which he was enjoined, by a secret cabinet order, from lecturing further on religion. Later, academic freedom in German universities was to be guaranteed by the Prussian Constitution.

A good teacher provides his students with means by which they can judge even himself, and if his name is Kant, he does so under the obligation of self-respect and respect for

his students. In the announcement of arrangements for his lectures in 1765-1766 he confidently proclaimed that:

The philosophical author whom one selects as the basis of a course of instruction should be regarded not as the model of judgment but only as an occasion to judge of him, yes, even against him; and the method of reflecting *for himself* and coming to conclusions is the thing, facility in which the pupil is really seeking, and which alone can be useful to him . . .

In short, he is to learn, not *thoughts*, but *thinking*; he is to be *guided*, not *carried*, if he is to be able to *walk* alone in the future.  
(emphasis in original)

This doctrine of independent critical judgment at the university level, in conjunction with the related doctrine of experimentation at lower levels of education, has provided the solvent of dogmatisms to which even Kant felt himself entitled. The question is whether there is an acceptable alternative to procedures that can be made self-correcting. There would seem to be none better suited to the making of selves.

St. Bonaventure University

GERARD HINRICHS

Josef Pieper, *Scholasticism, Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy*; New York, N. Y.: Pantheon Books, 1960; 192 pages. \$3.00.

With the modesty of the truly learned, Josef Pieper states that this work "aspires to be more than an introduction which assumes and gratefully builds upon the results of scholarly research into the history of scholasticism." Despite the quiet tone of the author regarding his accomplishment, it is manifest that the laborious, painstaking study required for such an extensive and penetrating insight into the intellectual achievement of thinkers from Boethius to William of Ockham can only be the fruit of a lifetime devoted to research in this area.

The author skillfully reveals that the period between Greco-Roman antiquity and "Modern Times" known by the terms *media aetas*, *medium aevum*, does not deserve the once-held contemptuous meaning which implied a period of waiting in which nothing of importance happened. On the contrary, it was a time of fecund productivity of a highly scientific character. Drawing upon his own treasury of knowledge and utilizing effectively the research of other scholars, the author shows conclusively that the period was one built upon the Christian and pagan heritage from antiquity and one that engaged in a progressive evolution to newer doctrines which its learned thinkers expressed in prolific written evidence now the subject of study by contemporary researchers.

Although it may be admitted that

the initial terminus of the Middle Ages appears more or less flexible, with acumen Josef Pieper selects the year 529 A.D. as a prior boundary. This temporal designation is not an arbitrary one but is chosen because it was then that the Christian Emperor Justinian issued an edict which closed the Platonic Academy in Athens, thus bringing the cessation of an institution of learning that had flourished for nine hundred years. In addition, the author points out something about this particular date that has been overlooked by less astute researchers, namely, that this year marked the founding of Monte Cassino by St. Benedict. Pieper shows why these events are a demarcation between two periods. With commendable perspicacity, the author chooses Boethius to play the role of an introductory figure to the Middle Ages, and skillfully shows the indubitable position of "the last of the ancients and the first of the schoolmen." Likewise, in the selection of the posterior boundary of the Middle Ages, Professor Pieper shows that he is a savant.

Although the book has as its primary end the presentation of the "scholarliness" of the period, as the title, *Scholasticism*, suggests, a secondary but no less important aim is achieved by the excellent picture of the intellectual life of the sixth through the fourteenth centuries depicted by the abbreviated but pertinent biographical details of a vast number of important personalities

of the period. While the work merits study because of the personalities involved, it is rather because of the treatment of the problems of medieval philosophy and theology that it should be given careful consideration.

In answer to the question "What defined the great age of scholasticism?"—the author shows how the great *magistri*, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, carried out the coordination of believing acceptance of revealed and traditional truth, on the one hand, and rational argumentation, on the other, with unfailing resoluteness as well as with judicious ability to decide just where to draw the line between the claims of reason and the claims of faith.

Professor Pieper shows that the problem of faith and reason sprang to the fore from Boethius *opuscula sacra*. These tracts depart from previous writings of a similar type and indicate that Boethius was undertaking something really new when he announced his intention to explain previously discussed doctrines by reason alone. Not a single Biblical quotation is to be found in these writings, regardless of the fact that they dealt almost exclusively with theological subjects. Boethius thus sets the stage by presenting a problem that was to run throughout medieval writings, namely, the multi-faceted roles of faith and reason under the guidance of reason.

The path, from the conjunction of

the two elements, *fides* and *ratio*, by St. Anselm, to their dichotomy in the later Middle Ages into various species of rationalism or into hazardous irrationalization of faith, is traced through the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite, John the Scot, Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, John of Salisbury, Hugh of St. Victor, Albertus Magnus, Siger of Brabant, St. Thomas, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, among others.

The author concludes from the many studies that the solution sought by the Schoolmen was not realized. However, for contemporary philosophers and theologians, these attempts have not lost their validity as paradigms. Although present-day thinkers may not engage in the compilation of *summae*, nevertheless, as Prof. Pieper remarks, a T. S. Eliot and a Pierre Teilhard de Chardin give expression to aspects of the problem in a fashion

eminently suitable for our own times.

To an author who has devoted his outstanding prowess to the re-statement of traditional wisdom in terms of problems in a number of fields, we cannot fail to express our appreciation and commendation. Our view of *Scholasticism* is, indeed, favorable. However, we regret that Prof. Pieper, in giving the authentic doctrine of William of Ockham, quotes from the *Centilogium* (1) *theologicum*, concl. 6. The doctrine of an individual is to be found in his authentic works. Also, while on the whole there is faithful adherence to the doctrine of Scotus, still there is reason to raise questions regarding some of the summations. Attention should also be given to consistency in italicizing of technical terms.

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
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